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THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH ABOUT BEST INTERESTS 
JULIA HALLORAN MCLAUGHLIN* 
The child’s right to be reared by loving parents or loving parent-like adults 
shapes this paper.1  The child’s right is defined, not in biological or legal terms, 
but in familial and relationship terms.  This Article advocates legal recognition 
of the right of a child, who has established a loving parental relationship or a 
loving relationship with a parent-like adult, to continue that relationship.  The 
relationship arises over time and is characterized by continuing, predictable, 
and nurturing care.  It results in an emotional bond leading to healthy physical, 
psychological, and emotional development.2 
 
* Julia H. McLaughlin is an associate professor at Florida Costal School of Law.  I would like to 
thank my research assistants Lydia Strom, FCSL Class of 2010, and Caitlin Whalen, FCSL Class 
of 2011.  I am in debt to my colleagues Professor Rebekah Gleason Hope and Professor 
Christopher Roederer for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this Article.  Finally, I am 
grateful to Professor June Carbone.  Any errors or oversights are my own. 
 1. This article was inspired by and builds upon the scholarship that precedes it.  See JAMES 
G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That 
Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships With Parent-Like 
Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358 (1994); David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children’s 
Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 1117, 1137 (2003) (“The denomination of 
children’s associational interest as rights might lead some judges to give greater credence to the 
emotional losses suffered by children when important familial bonds are severed.”); David D. 
Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 
858 (2006) (“States enjoy considerable latitude to reorient parentage law in a child-centered 
direction.”); David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1461, 1466 (2006) (“The constitutional protection of parental rights is always necessarily 
qualified by the competing interests of other family members.”); Lawrence Schlam, Third-Party 
“Standing” and Child Custody Disputes in Washington: Non-Parent Rights—Past, Present, 
and . . . Future?, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 391, 459 (2007–08) (“The best interests of children in 
custody is a compelling state interest.”); Deborah Parach, The Orphaning of Underprivileged 
Children: America’s Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 119, 158 (2006) 
(suggesting that courts should always consider the “best interests of the child” before terminating 
parental rights). 
 2. By definition, the term distinguishes between relationships of short duration, 
relationships in which the adult is paid to care for the child, and relationships that lack a 
continuing care-taking attribute.  It does not include neighbors, teachers, day-care providers, or 
strangers. 
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This right is not new.  It has historically been recognized through the 
application of the Best Interests of the Child Standard (“BICS”).3 Nevertheless, 
this right has been largely ignored by the Supreme Court in its recent custody 
decisions regarding parents’ fundamental rights.  It is now time to recognize 
the traditional role of the BICS and to afford children their constitutional right 
to preserve existing, loving, and nurturing parent and parent-like relationships.4  
This Article, therefore, proposes that a child’s right to enjoy loving and 
nurturing parent-like relationships should be formally recognized as a 
constitutionally protected fundamental right.  Additionally, courts should 
evaluate this right as one aspect of the substantive due process rights belonging 
to a child in a third-party dispute concerning custody of the child.5 
Departing from the initial definition of a “person” afforded rights under the 
Constitution, landowning male citizens of Anglo-Saxon descent,6 the Supreme 
Court has gradually expanded the definition to include black men,7 Native 
 
 3. I use the acronym “BICS” to refer to the best interests of the child standard throughout 
this paper. DWYER, supra note 1, at 23 (“A complete account of children’s relationship rights 
against the state, therefore, requires identifying not only those legal rules that explicitly confer 
such rights but also legal rules that, though not speaking in terms of rights, implicitly confer 
rights upon children by imposing upon state officials a duty owed to children to respect their 
wishes, to make or act on an individualized assessment of their best interests or to take particular 
actions deemed to be generally conducive to their welfare.”).  See also id. at 123–69 (providing a 
theoretical justification for extending the relationship rights of children). 
 4. I struggled with how best to refer to this conception of a child’s fundamental right to 
continue such relationships and settled on the term “loving and nurturing parent-like 
relationships.”  See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding 
of Caregivers and Caregiving, 94 VA. L. REV. 385 (2008).  Murray explores the possibility of 
creating a legally recognized status of caretaker to promote “[a] theory that acknowledges the 
degree to which parents function as parts of caregiving networks in discharging their caregiving 
obligations . . . .”  Id. at 435. 
 5. Custody refers to court awards of physical custody or visitation, without regard to the 
amount of time awarded. 
 6. See Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist 
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1531 (1985).  Simon writes, “Even with 
respect to constitutional provisions as to which originalist interpretation has appeal, strong 
justification may exist for alternative interpretations.  The clearest cases of this kind are those in 
which originalism would perpetuate the Constitution as a bargain struck by propertied, white 
males based at least partly on narrow grounds of self-interest or on that group’s arguably 
parochial interpretation of the deep consensus.”  Id. 
 7. Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860–1870, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2153 (1996): 
  One of the most important outcomes of the Civil War was the establishment of a new 
constitutional order.  Under this new order, African Americans, a people whose essential 
human rights had been denied under the old constitutional order, were constitutionally 
emancipated from slavery and recognized as American citizens.  They received the 
privileges and immunities that white Americans had automatically assumed.  Male black 
Americans also received the right to vote. 
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Americans,8 nonfreeholders,9 women10 and children.11  Under the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court synthesized the meaning of “all men are created equal”12 
and “the state shall not deprive any person of life, liberty or property without 
 
Compare Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404, 407 (1856) (holding neither those persons who 
were imported as slaves nor their descendants are included in the definition of “people of the 
United States” or “citizens” entitled to the rights and privileges under the Constitution), with The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment 
“overturn[ed] the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and 
subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States”). 
 8. Native Americans were not fully franchised by the federal government until Congress 
extended citizenship to all Native Americans in 1924. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 
253 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000)). 
 9. See Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1509–10 
(2002) (“Property supplied independence; those without property were presumed to be 
economically dependent on and subservient to others.  As a result, they would be subject to 
political manipulation and control by their economic patrons and social betters.  The propertyless, 
with the rest of the community, would be better off with virtual representation by the 
propertied.”). 
 10. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1974) (Bradley, J., concurring): 
  As a result of [stereotypical] notions such as these, our statute books gradually 
became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, 
throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many 
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.  Neither slaves 
nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and 
married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or 
to serve as legal guardians of their own children.  And although blacks were guaranteed 
the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right—which is itself 
‘preservative of other basic civil and political rights’—until adoption of the Nineteenth 
Amendment half a century later. 
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)) (citation omitted); see Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969)).  See also 
Henry Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, Life with Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321 (1978), reprinted in 
FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS: LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 321–22 (Sanford N. 
Katz & Monroe L. Inker eds., 1979) (“As long as feudalism or its relics remained, the wife was 
not a legal person in the eyes of the law, and her role as mother merely entitled her to respect but 
not to authority.”) (citing I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 453 
(1783)); Ex Parte Hewitt, 11 Rich. 326, 329 (S.C. 1858) (“By common law the legal existence of 
a woman is suspended during marriage.”). 
 11. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (discussing freedom of 
speech); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 78 (1976) 
(“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the 
state-defined age of maturity.  Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and 
possess constitutional rights.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (discussing equal 
protection); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (discussing due process).  See infra, notes 153–
66 and accompanying text related to the recognition and expansion of the constitutional rights of 
children. 
 12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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due process of law”13 by extending due process rights without regard to race, 
gender, or class.14 
Through precedent, the Supreme Court continues to extend and refine the 
interpretation of rights afforded individuals under the Due Process Clause.15  
Children possess many of these recently recognized rights.16  The Court, 
however, has not afforded children’s relationship rights strict protection.  
Despite this lack of Supreme Court leadership, state courts are beginning to 
recognize the fundamental nature of the child’s right to have third-party 
custody claims determined by the BICS.17  This Article examines the 
interrelationship between the child’s fundamental right to continue existing 
parent-like relationships and the BICS.18 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 14. See William M. Wiecek, The Emergence of Equality as a Constitutional Value: The First 
Century, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 233, 243 (2007): 
  Embedded in Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment were ideas propounded 
by innovative abolitionist lawyers and publicists before the war, including equality before 
the law. Abolitionists demanded this not as some abstract ideal, not as a vague statement 
or aspiration of antebellum social conditions, but as the actual realization of the promise 
of the Declaration of Independence for all people.  Dismissed in its time (and after) as 
impractical, utopian, otherworldly, radical, or unreal, abolitionist thought truly was the 
stone rejected by the builders that became the cornerstone, not least in its vision of 
equality. 
(citations omitted). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also 
Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597, 602 (2005): 
  The expansion of regulatory power at the time of the New Deal required a 
concomitant reduction in the Court’s previously broad interpretation of liberty under the 
Due Process Clause.  After 1937, the issue became how to reconstruct that liberty in light 
of the New Deal Court’s general deference to the political process.  In particular, having 
limited due process liberty to the rights listed in the text of the Bill of Rights, the New 
Deal Court had to decide whether all of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated against 
the states.  It was here that the traditional doctrine of the Ninth Amendment made its last 
stand.  Applying a rule of construction based on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the 
Supreme Court initially resisted incorporation claims in order to preserve the states’ 
retained rights to establish local rules of criminal procedure.  As the Court gradually 
incorporated most of the Bill of Rights, this final application of the traditional Ninth 
Amendment also faded away. 
 16. See cases cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.  Critics of the increasing 
constitutionalization of family law argue that it creates both “bad constitutional law” and “bad 
family law.”  See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, FAM. L.Q. 529, 552 
(2008). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 167–217. 
 18. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference and Mystery: Children’s 
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 20 (1994) (“Demonstrating how both 
constitutional and family law jurisprudence . . . exclude children’s personhood.”). 
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State legislatures have universally adopted the BICS19 and applied it to 
determine custody and visitation disputes.  In contrast, the BICS is sparingly 
applied in third-party custody claims.20  Although sometimes the subject of 
scholarly critique,21 courts variously refer to the BICS standard as 
“paramount”22 and “compelling,”23 descriptive language associated with state 
 
 19. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30–3–1 (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (2009); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25–403 (LexisNexis 2009); Ariz. Legis. Serv.  25,403,  25,409 (West 2009); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9–13–103 (West 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3000, 3080, 3100(a) (West 
2009); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3102–3104 (Deering 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14–10–123.5, 14–
10–124, 19–1–117 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–59 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
13, §§ 727–728 (2009); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16–911 (a)(5), 16–914 (LexisNexis 2009); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 61.13(2), (6–7) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 19–9–3(A)–(D) (West 2008); 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 571–46.1,  571–46.2  (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32–717B, 32–719 
(2009);  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601, 5/602, 5/602.1, 5/607, 5/607(b)–(e) (2009); IND. C 
ODE ANN. §§ 31–17–1–1–5, 31–17–2–8 (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 
2009);  KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60.1610 (West 2009);  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.270, 
405.021 (West 2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19A, §1651–1654 (2009); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW 
§§ 5–203, 5–203(D)(2) (West 2009), 9–102 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, 
§ 39D (West 2009), MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 28, 208, § 31, 209C, § 10  (LexisNexis 2009); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.26(a),  722.27(b) (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.17, 
518.175,  257C.08  (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93–5–24,  93-16-1 (West 2009); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 452.402 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40–4–212,  40–9–102 (2009); NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 42–364, 43–1802 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125C.050, 125.465, 125.480, 
480.490 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461–A:6 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2–1, 9:2–
4(c), 9:2–7.1 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40–9–1, 40–9–2, 40–9–3, 40–9–4 (West 2009); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50–11.2, 50–13.2 (2009); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14–09–06 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.04, § 3109.051 
(LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 112 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
107.105(1), 107.169; 109.119 (West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301, 5303–5304, 5311–
5312 (2009) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15–5–16, 15–5–24.1 to 24.3 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20–3–
160, 20–7–420 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, §§ 25–4–45, 25–4–52, 25–5–7.1 (2009); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 36–6–101, 36–6–106 (West 2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.005, 153.007 
(Vernon 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30–3–10 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (2009); 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20–107.2, 20–124.3 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.050, 
26.09.002 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48–9–101 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
767.41, 767.451 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20–2–201 (2009). 
 20. Erin E. Wynne, Children’s Rights and the Biological Bias in Biological Parent Versus 
Third-Party Custody Disputes, 27 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 179, 182 (1997). 
 21. See Jonathan Todres, Rights Relationships and the Experience of Children Orphaned by 
AIDS, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 417, 438 n.95 (2007) (“Although the best interests of the child 
standard has been utilized by courts and governments for over 100 years, it is not without its 
critics.”).  For an analysis of the standard, see CLAIRE BREEN, THE STANDARDS OF THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A WESTERN TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
(2002); Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and 
Human Rights, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS VOL. II, at 183 (Michael D.A. Freeman ed., 2004). 
 22. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra note 229–30 and accompanying text. 
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interests weighty enough to limit fundamental rights.24  The Supreme Court, 
though, inconsistently characterizes the BICS as sometimes “important” and 
other times of “constitutional importance.”25  Surprisingly, scholars have paid 
scant attention to whether a court may properly rely upon the BICS as 
advancing a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the limitation of a 
parent’s fundamental right in matters of child-rearing.26 
One reason to characterize the BICS as a compelling interest is to protect 
the child’s underlying fundamental right to preserve existing parent-like 
relationships.27  Some state courts already implicitly recognize the child’s right 
as fundamental and protect the right by applying the BICS.28  It is time that 
courts and legislators expressly recognize the child’s underlying fundamental 
right to preserve existing loving and nurturing parent-like relationships and 
protect them by applying the BICS in all custody cases, including third-party 
claims. 
Part I of this Article traces the origins and historical evolution of the BICS 
standard as it emerged to become the guardian of a child’s relationship rights.  
Part II examines the modern evolution of the BICS and its recognition of a 
child’s right to preserve existing parent-like relationships.  Part III first 
analyzes Supreme Court precedent, recognizing the unenumerated right to 
family privacy and the related presumption that parents act in the best interests 
of their children, and then concludes that this concept fails children by 
subordinating their interests to those of their parents—silencing their voices.  
Part IV discusses Supreme Court treatment of the BICS and explores the 
 
 24. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra note 221–41 and accompanying text. 
 26. David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1150 (2001). 
 27. Eric G. Anderson, Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal 
Standards, 1998 BYU L. REV. 935, 940 (1998). 
 28. See infra note 207–08 and accompanying text.  Some scholars have noted that interests 
need not always rise to the level of a legally protected right.  See Anderson, supra note 27, at 
939–40: 
  The phrase “interests of the child” or “best interests of the child” is commonplace in 
the law.  It appears in the legislation and case law dealing with children in various legal 
settings, such as adoption, child protective services, and custody disputes between 
divorcing parents.  Its deceptively smooth surface covers something quite complex for, as 
typically used, it refers not to one person’s (i.e., a child’s) interests, but to a legal 
standard.  In unpacking that standard one finds the very collection of competing goals and 
interests discussed in this article. 
. . . . 
  A conclusion reached by some children’s advocates is that the child’s interest should 
be represented not merely by granting it weight in the competition with other interests, but 
by enshrining it as a right. 
(citation omitted). 
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resulting state court confusion as to the proper application in third-party 
custody disputes, turning to early BICS precedent for guidance.  Part V 
proposes a constitutional framework to recognize and protect a child’s 
fundamental right to continue existing loving and nurturing parent-like 
relationship. 
I.  THE COMMON LAW ORIGIN AND BIRTH OF THE BICS EVIDENCES THE 
CHILD’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A “WISE, AFFECTIONATE, AND CAREFUL 
PARENT.”29 
The BICS, a standard universally embraced by American state courts in 
custody matters,30 was born in the English common law tradition.31  The BICS 
extended protections afforded to orphaned and abandoned children, flowing 
from the parens patriae authority of the state, to children involved in custody 
disputes.32  One way to understand the BICS is to view it as a lens that 
continues to define and refine the relationship of the rights and duties existing 
between parents, child, and state.33  Sometimes courts rely on the BICS to 
resolve disputes in which the state, acting as parens patriae on behalf of the 
child, sues a parent it deems unfit.34  In other instances, courts apply the BICS 
to resolve private custody disputes.35 
Before the Norman Conquest in 1066, a woman enjoyed the right to exit a 
marriage taking her children and half of the marital property under Anglo-
Saxon law.36  But with the rise of feudalism in England, women were 
increasingly denied the status of personhood.37  Feudalism eviscerated female 
identity, in part, by eliminating a mother’s right to retain real and personal 
property and her right to custody of her children upon separation or divorce.38  
Fathers enjoyed presumptive and absolute hegemony in the feudal family 
hierarchy.39  This presumption, perhaps, worked in cases where fathers 
provided sufficient physical, financial, and emotional support within the 
family, but it raised difficult moral and legal questions in the absence of a 
benign patriarch. 
 
 29. Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925). 
 30. See sources cited supra note 19. 
 31. Blissets Case, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 899, 899 (K.B.) (awarding custody to mother because 
it was “best for the child”); Powel v. Cleaver, (1789) 29 Eng. Rep. 274, 277 (Ch.) (protecting 
child’s legacy from testator, absent father’s claim of guardianship). 
 32. Wynne, supra note 20, at 180–82. 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 167–217. 
 34. Wynne, supra note 20, at 181. 
 35. Id. at 182. 
 36. Foster & Freed, supra note 10, at 139. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 140. 
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English common law recognized the father’s right to control matters of 
custody of children as a matter of natural law.40  Some scholars relate the 
patrilineal custody presumption to the hierarchical structures of the church and 
the state.41  When parents were absent or deemed unfit, the state exercised its 
parens patriae authority to determine guardianship matters.42  In these 
instances, the state initiated the legal action.43  Thus, the parens patriae 
authority of the court predates and presages the development and application of 
the BICS at early common law.44  When faced with difficult facts and unhappy 
parties filing private custody actions, courts relied upon the BICS as one way 
to resolve custody disputes.45  As parents and relatives of children turned to 
courts to determine private custody disputes, courts extended the parens patriae 
power to justify state intervention and described the applicable legal standard 
in terms of the child’s best interests.46 
A. The Parens Patriae Doctrine Fosters the BICS 
The phrase parens patriae means “parent of the country,” referring 
“traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons 
under legal disability, such as juveniles.”47  Historically, the doctrine supported 
 
 40. See, e.g., In re Agar-Ellis, (1883) 24 Ch.D. 317, 337–38 (U.K.) (“[I]t is not the benefit to 
the infant as conceived by the court, but it must be the benefit to the infant having regard to the 
natural law which points out that the father knows far better as a rule what is good for his children 
than a Court of Justice can.”).  This is particularly interesting because in the 19th century, 
American courts relied upon natural law to support the award of young children to the mother.  
See, e.g., Mercein v. People ex. rel. Barry, 21 Wend. 64, 104 (N.Y. 1840) (granting custody of 
daughter to mother because “the law of nature has given to her an attachment for her infant 
offspring which no other relative will be likely to possess in an equal degree”). 
 41. Foster & Freed, supra note 10, at 139–40. 
 42. Note, State Interests in the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1222 (1980). 
 43. Id. at 1224. 
 44. Id. at 1221–22. 
 45. Arguably, a different standard was needed because the parens patriae authority could be 
exercised only to prevent harm to the individual. Lynne Mairie Kohm, Tracing the Foundation of 
the Best Interests of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 
346 (2008). 
 46. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 195 (2000).  “In 1839 
Joseph Story defended the American conception of equity jurisdiction over child custody.’’  Id.  
Judge Story wrote that the court had a responsibility to protect children from fathers “guilty of 
gross ill-treatment or cruelty, . . . drunkenness, . . . debauchery, . . . [or] domestic associations 
[that] tended to the corruption and contamination of [the child].”  Id. (citing JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 
529–33 (London A. Maxwell, 2d ed. 1839)). 
 47. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). 
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the King’s right to determine wardship of orphans,48 a potentially valuable 
benefit conferred by the crown upon the ward if the child had inherited 
wealth.49  William Blackstone described the King, when exercising parens 
patriae authority, as “the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics; 
and has the general superintendence of all charitable uses in the kingdom.”50 
As an example, the English Crown exercised its parens patriae authority in 
1620 by authorizing the Virginia Company to remove one-hundred street 
children from London, to “do whatever necessary to force the children into the 
ships,” and to transport them to Virginia to become apprentices.51  Destitute 
children, wards of the English state, became indentured servants abroad.52  
This practice provided much needed labor to the New World and relieved the 
English government of its moral and economic responsibility to care for the 
indentured children abroad.53  So children, like women, suffered a chattel-like 
status, owing labor in exchange for room and board to the combined 
patriarchal powers of state and father.54 
In addition to determining the custody of street children, England also 
removed children from the custody of impoverished parents.55  The state 
adopted a minimum standard of acceptable care and summarily placed poor 
children in involuntary apprenticeships without a BICS determination.56  This 
minimum standard of acceptable care excused the state from policing parents 
and from securing the best or most optimal familial circumstances.57  The state 
 
 48. Christine Steib Stickler, In re S.G.: Parens Patriae and Wardship Proceedings— Exactly 
Who in the State Should Determine the Best Interests of the Child?, 7 WIDENER J. OF PUB. L. 377, 
380 (1998). 
 49. Id. at 380–81.  Historians disagree as to whether the King’s determination of custody 
should accurately be characterized as the exercise of parens patriae power given the monetary 
value of the determination, as well as the debt owed to the crown flowing from the determination.  
Id. at 381. 
 50. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE STUDENT’S BLACKSTONE: COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 285 (Robert Malcolm Kerb ed., John Murray 1865). 
 51. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY 
OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994). 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Id.  Mason notes that “[m]ore than half of all persons who came to the Colonies south of 
New England were indentured servants” between the ages of fourteen and sixteen.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 14–15. 
 55. Janet Dolgin, Transforming Childhood: Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 1113, 1122 (1997).  Under the English Poor Law, town officials were charged to seek 
apprenticeships for the children of the poor.  Id. 
 56. Id.  (“Almost from the start, however, this system for establishing voluntary 
apprenticeships co-existed alongside another system which established involuntary 
apprenticeships for impoverished children.”). 
 57. Donald N. Duquette, Child Protection Legal Process: Comparing the United States and 
Great Britain, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 239, 279 (1992): 
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instead assured the children a bare minimum of food and shelter.58  Parens 
patriae authority has thus been described as “a slim reed” upon which to 
entrust the welfare of a child, providing only a minimum degree of safety and 
protection.59 
American state courts originally relied upon the parens patriae authority of 
the state to remove children from custody of their parents if the children were 
incorrigible or if the parents were “incompetent or corrupt.”60  In 1836, Justice 
Story interpreted the states’ parens patriae authority to supersede the parents’ 
rights: 
[P]arents are entrusted with the custody of the persons and the education, of 
their children, yet this is done upon the natural presumption, that the children 
will be properly taken care of . . . and that they will be treated with kindness 
and affection. . . . But whenever . . . a father . . . acts in a manner injurious to 
the morals or interests of his children—in every case, the Court of Chancery 
will interfere.61 
Justice Story defined the American court’s expanded concept of parens patriae 
to embrace a BICS: 
The use of this individualized power was supported in tradition by the English 
courts’ increasing use of chancery courts to determine the welfare and property 
of minors under the doctrine of parens patriae. . . . 
  In America the equitable tradition of chancery court was gradually 
extended by judges to consider the best interests of the children against those 
of their parents, even where there was not gross abuse.62 
 Justice Story traced the origins of the BICS to the English parens patriae 
doctrine and recognized the implicit balancing of familial rights required by 
the BICS.  Currently, U.S. courts exercise two types of parens patriae 
 
The language of the statutes generally allow intervention based on physical abuse, 
abandonment, failure to provide proper food, clothing, shelter, or parental care and 
supervision, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, educational and medical neglect, and failure 
to protect a child reasonably from physical or sexual abuse.  Although the “best interests 
of the child” is not the proper legal standard for initial adjudication, it is the most common 
test for framing dispositional orders. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., In re T.L., 1996 WL 393521, at *3 (Mo. Cir. 1996) (citing Allen v. Allen, 626 
P.2d 16, 23 (Wash. App. 1981) (“The ‘best interests’ test does not adequately protect a biological 
parent’s primary right to custody and the ‘parental unfitness’ test does not sufficiently protect a 
minor child’s welfare, and therefore, the Court adopts the ‘actual detriment to the child’ test.”)). 
 60. Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 9–10 (Pa. 1839). 
 61. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 676 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, and Co. 13th ed. 1886). 
 62. MASON, supra note 51, at 58. 
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authority: public and private.63  A developing cannon of Supreme Court family 
privacy case law limits the states’ public parens patriae authority to remove 
children to cases in which children are declared delinquent by courts, or 
parents are deemed unfit,64 and thus, deemed to have lost the constitutional 
right to the care, custody, and control of their children.65  In private custody 
disputes between fit parents, the BICS controls.66  Traditionally, the state 
becomes involved only upon the request of the petitioning party, and it 
exercises its limited decision-making authority within the parameters of the 
BICS. 
B. The BICS Comes of Age 
The BICS emerged in England as early as 1733 and offered a new custody 
standard designed to avoid the pitfalls of the paternal presumption.67  In 1774, 
Lord Mansfield decided Blissets Case and awarded custody to the mother, over 
the father’s objection, in order to further the child’s education and welfare.68  
Because the father was “bankrupt, abusive and improper,” according to the 
court, “the public right of the community to superintend the education of its 
members, and to disallow what for its own security and welfare it should see 
good to disallow, went beyond the rights and authorities of the father.”69  In the 
next century, English courts expressly identified and applied the BICS based 
upon customary law existing from “time immemorial.”70  Courts initially 
applied the BICS in deciding matters of the custody of orphans and then 
 
 63. See Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1156, 1223–24 (1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]: 
Most late nineteenth century courts thus acknowledged that the child’s welfare, not the 
parent’s legal right, was the determinative factor in private custody decisions under the 
parens patriae power. 
  In the public custody context, by contrast, courts expanded and distorted the parens 
patriae power by invoking it to uphold broad child neglect and delinquency statutes that 
provided for state-initiated intervention into the family.  The vague and sweeping clauses 
in these statutes gave the courts discretionary power to decide which children were in 
need of the state’s supervision. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 64. Anderson, supra note 27, at 936.  While the fitness rule as applied in abuse and neglect 
cases may be appropriate, the BICS is better suited for third-party custody and visitation cases 
which more closely resemble a traditional custody dispute, not a removal proceeding.  Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Developments in the Law, supra note 63, at 1202. 
 67. Kohm, supra note 40, at 354. 
 68. Id.  (citing Blissets Case, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 899, 899 (K.B.)). 
 69. Blissets Case, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 899, 899 (K.B.). 
 70. Kohm, supra note 45, at 360.  This suggests little distinction between the BICS and the 
parens patriae doctrine in the formative stages of the BICS. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
124 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:113 
extended it to custody disputes between parents.71  So as early as 1733, some 
English courts rejected the tradition of patriarchal supremacy in favor of the 
BICS.72 
The trajectory of the BICS, however, was uneven and lacked predictability.  
Approximately seventy years later, in the case of DeManneville v. 
DeManneville,73 an English court reinforced the paternal presumption, without 
any reference to Blissets Case74 or the application of the BICS, holding, “The 
law is clear, that the custody of a child, of whatever age, belongs to the father, 
if he chooses.”75  But the court allowed the mother access to the child “as is 
consistent with its [the child’s] happiness . . . .”76  Thus, despite some early 
precedent employing the BICS standard, the English courts preferred the 
feudal paternal presumption to award custody to the father, tempered by an 
award to the mother of “unrestrained physical access.”77  Patriarchal 
supremacy, crowning fathers as “the guardian of his child by nature and by 
nurture,” remained firmly embedded in English common law, accompanied by 
an emerging focus upon the child’s best interests.78 
Both the BICS and the paternal presumption crossed the seas with the 
English immigrants and emerged in American case law.79  In colonial America 
during the 1700s, the life of a child likely included work from a very young 
age.80  Parents often depended on children to assist in the grueling day-to-day 
tasks of tending to crops, animals, and other daily chores associated with 
survival in the newly settled lands.81  As previously noted, orphaned children 
were sent from England to America to become indentured servants.82  The 
demand for older children to assist with the burdens of daily survival showed 
 
 71.  Developments in the Law, supra note 63, at 1221–22: 
When the English chancery courts exercised the power delegated to them by the sovereign 
to act as ‘general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics,’ they were bound to use this 
power solely on behalf of the state ward and not to benefit others.  Initially, chancery 
courts refused to exercise their parens patriae power to override the custody rights of a 
child’s natural parents.  Instead, they sought primarily to ensure an orderly transfer of 
feudal duties between generations after a propertied minor’s parents had died. 
 72. Id. at 1223. 
 73. DeManneville v. DeManneville, (1804) 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch.). 
 74. Blissets Case, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 899, 899 (K.B.). 
 75. DeManneville, 32 Eng. Rep. at 764. 
 76. Id. at 767–68. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, (1827) 38 Eng. Rep. 236, 243 (Ch.).  See also, 
Developments in the Law, supra note 63, at 1223. 
 79. MASON, supra note 51, at xiii. 
 80. Id. at 2. 
 81. Id. at 3–4. 
 82. Id. at 2. 
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the valuable role children played in colonial homes.83  In some cases, if 
resources were scarce, children were “bound out” to neighbors.84  Wages were 
paid directly to the father, and children became a direct source of income.85  
The child constituted a valuable asset and, under the parens patriae doctrine, 
the child’s earnings and earning capacity belonged to the father.86 
In 1837, Judge Nelson justified the preferred status of fathers over mothers 
in matters of custody by writing: 
“[T]he law makes the father the guardian of his child by nature and by 
nurture;”. . . . 
 . . . The interference of the court with the relation of father and child, by 
withdrawing the latter from the natural affection, kindness and obligations of 
the former, is a delicate and strong measure; and the power should never be 
exerted except for the most sound and solid reasons.  In this country, the hopes 
of the child in respect to its education and future advancement, is mainly 
dependent upon the father; for this he toils and struggles through life; the 
desire of its accomplishment operating as one of the most powerful incentives 
to industry and thrift.87 
The product of the child’s industry was owed to the father in exchange for the 
legal obligation to support the child.88 One explanation for the persistent 
paternal preference is that the child’s economic future depended upon a 
father’s support.89  So the court employed a paternal custody presumption to 
secure the economic relationship between fathers and their children.  In 
essence, American courts equated best interests with economic security and, 
thus, applied the paternal preference. 
The BICS, rooted in the concept of parens patriae and the authority of the 
state to protect those unable to protect themselves, afforded the court more 
flexibility and some relief from the unsatisfactory analogy between property 
and children that had inexorably ended in paternal custody.  As early as the 
nineteenth century, some courts even applied the BICS to support the award of 
custody to a third party.90  One court relied upon the BICS in a private custody 
action to confirm custody in the maternal grandmother over the objection of 
the father.91  In another case, Chapsky v. Wood,92 Justice Brewer relied upon 
the BICS to resolve a custody dispute between the father and a third party: 
 
 83. Id. at 51. 
 84. Dolgin, supra note 55, at 1123. 
 85. Id. at 1126. 
 86. Wynne, supra note 20, at 181–82. 
 87. The People ex rel. I. Nickerson, 19 Wend. 16, 17, 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837). 
 88. Id. at 7. 
 89. MASON, supra note 51, at 53. 
 90. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 91. Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27, 30 (1881).  In custody dispute between maternal 
grandmother and father court must “act as humanity, respect for parental authority and respect for 
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[W]hen reclamation is not sought until a lapse of years, when new ties have 
been formed and a certain current given to the child’s life and thought, much 
attention should be paid to the probabilities of a benefit to the child from the 
change.  It is an obvious fact, that ties of blood weaken, and ties of 
companionship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity and welfare of 
the child depend on the number and strength of these ties, as well as on the 
ability to do all which the promptings of these ties compel.93 
American courts enjoyed flexibility and were able to rely upon either strain of 
English common law to resolve custody disputes.  This helps to explain the 
divergent and competing custody precedent in early American custody cases.  
Some courts applied the BICS and others the paternal presumption. 
As society changed with industrialization, a middle-class emerged, 
precipitating legal change.  By the late 1800s, some American courts began 
preferring mothers to fathers in custody matters.  Without expressly rejecting 
the patriarchal right to custody, state courts borrowed and applied the Blissets 
Case rule. 94  This change is sometimes attributed to the shift away from an 
agrarian society to an industrial society requiring unskilled workers, educated 
managers, and professionals.95  Men moved freely into the industrial 
workplace of the public sphere.96  Women were inducted into the “cult of true 
womanhood”97 where “women were to preserve the home as a refuge where 
altruism would prevail over greed, where piety and conscience would 
flourish”98—and “childrearing became the middleclass reason for being.”99  
Women assumed control over the private sphere, including control over 
children.100  Given the division of labor, with fathers working away from the 
home and mothers in the home taking care of children,101 courts began to 
award custody of children to fit mothers.102 
Some trial courts determining custody disputes continued to rely upon 
platitudes and stereotypes, simply replacing the presumption favoring paternal 
 
the infant’s best interests may prompt” while at the time applied a presumption favoring fathers 
because of “his greater ability and knowledge of the world” and his “primary obligation . . . to 
maintain, educate and promote the happiness of the child . . . .”  Id. 
 92. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).   
 93. Id. at 653. 
 94. MASON, supra note 51, at 81. 
 95. June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, 
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 966 (1991). 
 96. Id. at 967. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 968. 
 99. Id. at 969. 
 100. MASON, supra note 51, at 14. 
 101. Id. at 50–52. 
 102. Id. at 53, 58. 
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custody with favoritism for maternal custody.103  Other courts embraced a 
presumption recognizing the “natural right”104 of a mother to the custody of 
her children under the Tender Years presumption.105  Both gendered 
presumptions suffer from the same critique: neither identifies a custody 
standard comprised of criteria to determine the best placement for the 
individual child.  Instead, both rely upon gender as a proxy for caretaking.  
Indifferent to the limitations of custody by presumption, courts continued to 
prefer the Tender Years presumption or the paternal presumption over the 
arduous task of identifying and applying a relevant set of criteria to reach a 
fact-driven “best result” for the child.  Courts remained tempted by the 
certainty and economy afforded by gender-driven presumptions. 
In time, American courts gravitated toward the BICS standard, subject still 
to the Tender Years presumption as a factor favoring mothers before fathers in 
custody disputes.106  In this way, the patriarchal presumption in favor of fathers 
began to wane.107  In a period of less than two hundred years, the American 
view of the child as a miniature wage-earner was replaced by an emerging 
recognition of childhood as a period of development and growth from absolute 
dependence into adulthood.108  The mother became the center of the home and 
 
 103. Id. at 50–51. 
 104. The term “natural rights” is hard to define in relationship to custody.  Some scholars 
base the paternal presumption on natural law and others base the maternal presumption on it.  See, 
e.g., Dolgin, supra note 55, at 1155: 
  Within a half-century, alternative understandings of maternal, as compared with 
paternal, status and authority, though still sometimes competing with older 
understandings, had become conventional.  Generally courts reserved these new 
understandings for middle-class mothers, but sometimes even poor mothers, involved in 
disputes with their children’s masters or employers, benefitted from the century’s 
evolving conception of maternal status and authority.  In one such case, Osborn v. Allen, 
decided in 1857, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that maternal authority, though 
not as extensive as paternal authority, was predicated on the same understanding of 
parentage: “The authority and rights of parents over their children result from their 
duties.”  The Court’s Chief Justice further explained that, Blackstone’s eighteenth-century 
view of maternity notwithstanding, the proposition that mothers enjoy no legal power 
with regard to their children “is not consistent with the principles of natural law, with the 
rules of the common law, or with the dictates of sound public policy.” 
(footnotes omitted). 
 105. Kohm, supra note 45, at 346. 
 106. Id. at 347. 
 107. But see State v. Stigall, 22 N.J.L. 286, 288 (N.J. 1847) (applying paternal presumption to 
custody case). 
 108. Kohm, supra note 45, at 347.  The importance of child-developmental theory, 
particularly attachment theory, plays a critical role in identifying the appropriate content of the 
BICS and the status of third parties who parent children.  Shelley A. Riggs, Is the Approximation 
Rule in the Child’s Best Interests? A Critique from the Perspective of Attachment Theory, 43 
FAM. CT. REV. 481, 490 (2005). 
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hearth, charged with the rearing of children.109  The father replaced the family 
unit as the primary source of monetary support.110  Thus, the gendered division 
of work emerged between the world of home, populated by uncompensated 
women, and the world of business, populated by compensated men.111 
The accompanying idealization of motherhood is reflected in the cases of 
the era dealing with the proper place and responsibilities of women.  In United 
States v. Bradwell,112 the Supreme Court relied upon the “divinely created” 
characteristics of women as child-bearers to block Myra Bradwell’s appeal for 
admittance to the Illinois bar.113  Thus, children became central to the idealized 
sphere of home and hearth managed by mothers.114 
By the early twentieth century, the paternal presumption in determining 
matters of custody was uniformly waning.115  Judge Cardozo is sometimes 
credited with embracing and defining the American approach to the BICS.116  
As previously noted, Judge Cardozo linked the state’s authority to regulate 
custody to the state’s obligation to “protect the incompetent or helpless” and 
described the judge’s obligation in custody disputes between parents to act: 
[A]s parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child.  He is to put 
himself in the position of a ‘wise affectionate and careful parent’, and make 
provision for the child accordingly. . . . He is not adjudicating a controversy 
between adversary parties, to compose their private differences.  He is not 
 
 109. MASON, supra note 51, at 59.  While the cult of motherhood protected the mother-child 
relationship, it did not grant equality in matters of other marital rights and responsibilities.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 52. 
 111. Id. at 52–53. 
 112. Id. at 53 (discussing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring)). 
 113. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141. 
 114. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Women’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ 
Household Labor, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087–88 (1994): 
[W]ives earned income from home-based labor in order to combine their market activities 
with household work and childcare. Keeping boarders was a common way to do this.  A 
married woman who kept boarders performed the work of the household for her family 
and for the market; indeed, in this period, when much of the service sector was still 
embedded in the household, boarding appears to have been a more lucrative form of 
employment than many other types of wage work available to women.  Outside urban and 
industrial areas, wives still performed the traditional work of spinning, weaving, milking, 
foraging, gardening, and producing cheese and butter. 
 115. E.g., Helms v. Fransciscus, 2 Bland. 544, 563 (Md. 1830).  The court recognized form of 
the Tender Years Presumption: “The father is the rightful and legal guardian of all his infant 
children; . . . [y]et even a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in contempt, 
and snatch helpless, puling [sic] infancy from the bosom of an affectionate mother, and place it in 
the course hands of the father.”  Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Vanessa A. Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: 
Reconciling the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247, 
263 (2007). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH ABOUT BEST INTERESTS 129 
determining rights ‘as between a child and a parent,’ or as between one parent 
and another.  He ‘interferes for the protection of infants, qua infants, by virtue 
of the prerogative which belongs to the Crown as parens patriae.’117 
Judge Cardozo builds upon Justice Story’s protective approach by declaring 
concern for the welfare of the child as controlling.118  The foregoing quote 
expressly acknowledges the relationship between the parens patriae authority 
and the BICS, both deemed rules of “settled and ancient origin.”119  Arguably, 
children enjoy a customary right to have custody matters determined based on 
the BICS. 
The common law development of the BICS in America can be explained 
by the transition from an agrarian society to an industrial society, the changing 
concept of women and children from chattel to autonomous individuals, the 
emergence of the separate spheres of public and private activity, and the 
replacement of the parens patriae paternal presumption by the maternal 
preference,120 followed by a gender-neutral presumption,121 favoring the 
primary care-giving parent over others.122  The BICS evidences the 
independent existence of a child’s relationship rights and creates a framework 
to protect them. 
II.  CURRENT INCARNATION OF THE BICS 
An examination of the current standard adopted to implement the BICS in 
the United States reveals that they are strikingly similar across state lines.123  
The BICS is typically statutorily defined in two parts.  The first formulation 
identifies the BICS in general terms and requires that custody decisions be 
made in the child’s best interests to advance and protect the child’s physical, 
 
 117. Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (internal citations omitted). 
 118. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 119. MASON, supra note 51, at 61. 
 120. Women slowly gained the de jure right, if not the de facto right, to the same property and 
personhood rights enjoyed by men.  Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: 
Historical and Legal Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 
604–05 (1997).  This process was advanced, in part, by relying upon the equal protection clause 
of the Constitution and by recognizing the need to employ intermediate scrutiny to gendered 
statutory language.  Id.  Many of the same stereotypes applied to children, were formerly applied 
to justify the disparate treatment of women as less intelligent, too emotional, psychologically 
weak, lacking in business expertise and in need of protection, are used to justify the secondary 
importance assigned to the interests of minors, without regard to age or maturation.  Id.  Just as 
American law and society moves toward gender equality to promote a just and fair treatment of 
women, the law of the child is in need of a similar reform to elevate as fundamental the rights of 
children in custody and visitation disputes. 
 121. Phyllis P. Bookspan, From a Tender Years Presumption to a Primary Parent 
Presumption: Has Anything Really Changed? Should It?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 79 (1993). 
 122. Id. at 83–84. 
 123. See infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
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mental, social, and moral well-being.124  The BICS is further solidified through 
statutory criteria to give shape to the guiding polestar.125 
Clearly, physical safety advances a fundamental right enjoyed by 
citizens.126  Mental well-being recognizes the importance of psychological 
welfare in addition to physical welfare.127  Social well-being recognizes the 
importance of a child’s relationship not only with parents, but with other 
family members, children in the family and outside the family, and adults in 
the community.128  Moral well-being, related to social well-being, recognizes 
the vital importance of inculcating children with values and the ability to 
discern right from wrong.129  The BICS, at its core, is designed to identify the 
parent to whom the child is most attached and solidify custody in that parent 
while maintaining the bond with the other parent. 
The factors discussed above reflect the fundamental importance of raising 
children well in the context of families, the greater community, and U.S. 
democracy.  An examination of the existing model custody rules reveals a 
factored focus upon advancing a child’s right to a loving and nurturing 
relationship with parent-like adults, despite the absence or collapse of 
marriage, through the application of the BICS. 
A. Model BICS Rules 
Despite the introduction of a factored approach, scholars continued to 
critique the BICS standard as indeterminate.  Drafters of the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act (UMDA)130 introduced a third-party standing requirement to 
 
 124. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 1, at 41. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656–57 (1960). 
 127. See, e.g., Vanessa L. Warzynski, Termination of Parental Rights: The “Psychological 
Parent” Standard, 39 VILL. L. REV. 737, 765–66 (1994).  Contrary to the presumption applied by 
many courts today, the best interests of a child are not always served by the care of the biological 
parent, even where that parent is judicially deemed fit, because the child may suffer severe 
psychological damage when removed from his or her “psychological” parents.  Id.  Rather, the 
best interests of the child are assured only by protecting the child’s psychological well-being as 
well as the child’s physical well-being.  Id. 
 128. DWYER, supra note 1, at 67. 
 129. Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the ‘Pall of Orthodoxy’: Value Training 
in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 19–20 (1987) (“Society must indoctrinate children 
so they may be capable of autonomy.  They must be socialized to the norms of society while 
remaining free to modify or even abandon those norms.  Paradoxically, education must promote 
autonomy while simultaneously denying it by shaping and constraining present and future 
choices.”). 
 130. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 401 (amended 1971 & 1973), 9A U.L.A. 281 
(1970) [hereinafter UMDA].  Following the release of the initial draft of the UMDA in 1970, as 
of 1989, six states had adopted some form of the UMDA custody approach. C. Gail Vasterling, 
Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: A Statute to End the 
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protect traditional parental custody rights.  Section 401(d)(1) limits the right of 
a third-party nonparent to initiate a custody action to instances where the child 
is not within the physical custody of one parent.131  The standing limitation 
protects the parental due process right to care for a child; but the standing bar 
entirely ignores the child’s interests.132  After satisfying the standing 
requirement, the third party then faces the presumption favoring parental 
claims over third-party claims as part of the BICS.133  The standing 
requirement can be characterized as a legislative attempt to channel third-party 
custody claims, limiting them to cases in which the child resides with neither 
parent, suggesting a total breakdown of the parent–child relationship.134 
The UMDA also incorporates the best interests standard: 
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the 
child.  The court shall consider all relevant factors including: 
1. The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody. 
2. The wishes of the child as to his [or her] custodian. 
3. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, 
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s 
best interests. (emphasis added). 
4. The child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community. 
5. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not 
affect his relationship to the child.135 
The UMDA adopts the BICS and identifies these five factual areas of inquiry, 
noted above, to assist the court in protecting the child’s underlying right to 
 
Tug-of-War?, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 923, 936 n.76 (1989).  Vasterling cites the following citations as 
versions of the UMDA “best interests” provision governing initial custody decisions of § 402: 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 772 (1981); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 403.270 (Michie 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 40-4-212 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C) (Anderson Supp. 1987). 
 131. UMDA § 401(b)(2). 
 132. Schlam, supra note 1, at 425–26.  See also UMDA §401(d).  States that adopted § 401(d) 
of the Act include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-331 (Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123 
(1973); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, § 601 (West’s Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-
20 (LexisNexis 1980); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.260 (West 1981); MINN. STAT.  § 518.156 
(Supp. 1982); and, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.180 (1981). 
 133. Schlam, supra note 1, at 447–48.  Schlam argues the standing requirement is 
unnecessary because the parental presumption adequately protects parents who have maintained 
strong relationships.  Id.  With respect to those parents who have not done so, psychological 
“parents should at least be able to be heard as to custody on an equal footing with natural or 
adoptive parents.” Id. 
 134. Id. at 425. 
 135. UMDA § 403. 
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maintain parental relationships.  Thus, the UMDA attempts to reign in judicial 
discretion by statutorily defining narrow third-party standing rules; but once 
standing is acquired, the standard retains the flexibility afforded by the BICS. 
In an attempt to cure the twin-ills of judicial bias and outcome uncertainty 
while recognizing third-party claims, the ALI proposes an alternative uniform 
custody approach by adopting the following version of the BICS: 
(1) The primary objective of Chapter 2 is to serve the child’s best 
interests, by facilitating all of the following: 
(a) Parental planning and agreement about the child’s custodial 
arrangements and upbringing; 
(b) Continuity of existing parent-child attachments; 
(c) Meaningful contact between the child and each parent; 
(d) Caretaking relationships by adults who love the child, know how 
to provide for the child’s needs, and place a high priority on doing 
so; 
(e) Security from exposure to conflict and violence; 
(f) Expeditious, predictable decision-making and the avoidance of 
prolonged uncertainty respecting arrangements for the child’s care 
and control.136 
In determining standing, the ALI recognizes that, in some instances, a third 
party assumes a parent-like status and is entitled to be heard under limited 
circumstances.137  A parent by estoppel is a third party who “has acted as a 
parent under certain specified circumstances which serve to estop the legal 
parent from denying the individual’s status as a parent.”138  In a secondary 
 
 136. A.L.I., ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 107 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
 137. Id. at 120.  Historically, parentage depended upon a biological tie to the child or 
adoption.  David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, 
Biological and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 130 (2006).  
Changing demographics have challenged courts and legislatures to recognize a growing array of 
parents and parent-like adults based upon best interests considerations including: “genetics, 
caregiving, marital ties and parenting intentions.”  Id. at 141.  Elizabeth Bartholet advocates a 
parent-picking approach that advances the child’s right to receive responsible parenting in the 
context of “an ongoing, stable, nurturing relationship.”  Elizabeth  Bartholet, Guiding Principles 
for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 344 (2004). 
 138. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, at 120–21.  In keeping with the possibility of multiple 
parents, Susan Appleton advocates legal recognition of the number of parents commensurate with 
a child’s experience.  Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 
69 (2008) (“Put differently, allowing recognition of more than two parents offers benefits for 
some individual children and opens up family law’s channeling efforts by increasing and 
diversifying the valid paths for others to follow.”).  Others, however, remain critical of the multi-
parent possibility recognized under the ALI custody provisions.  See, e.g., Emily Buss, 
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category is a de facto parent, who undertakes parental responsibilities with the 
permission of the legal parent or “because of a complete failure or inability of 
any legal parent to perform caretaking functions.”139  Thus, the ALI recognizes 
that third parties who assume parent-like status and parental obligations should 
have standing in custody disputes.140 This recognition advances the child’s 
fundamental right to preserve an existing, loving, and nurturing parent-like 
relationship.  The ALI also recognizes the child’s interests as superior to those 
of the adults involved by delineating not only when third parties have standing, 
but also by identifying the BICS factors to determine custody based on the 
child’s actual experiences and relationships rather than on stereotypes or 
hypothetical presumptions.141  The ALI custody principles provide guideposts 
to parties and the courts in defining best interests, eliminating some of the 
indeterminacy and the resulting strategic behavior that harms the child.142  The 
ALI also introduces the approximation rule to address criticisms that the BICS 
is too uncertain.143 
 
“Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 680 (2002).  Buss advocates broad state authority to 
identify parents, both traditional and nontraditional and narrow authority to interfere in parental 
decision-making once the parents are identified.  Id. 
 139. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, at 130.  Another concern is the all or nothing approach 
to parenting that couples parenting rights with financial responsibility.  See, e.g., Bartholet, supra 
note 137, at 339: 
Obviously it is problematic from the child’s perspective to be given a father who has no 
interest in the nurturing piece of parenting simply because the man might have wages 
available to be garnished.  If there is another man available who seems suitable for the 
nurturing piece of parenting, we should consider him for the parent role regardless of 
whether he can take care of financial support responsibilities. 
 140. David Meyer has argued that the ALI definitions of parent by estoppel and de facto 
parent may satisfy the Troxel plurality standard if the case is interpreted narrowly to reveal, “a 
glimmer of hope that the court will be willing to redefine family.”  See David D. Myer, What 
Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 
1075, 1102–03 (2001).  A less forgiving interpretation of Troxel might characterize the case as 
laying the groundwork for a very narrow exception to parent hegemony in custody and visitation 
matters pregnable only by third parties who can establish harm to the child if visitation is denied. 
 141. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, at 104. 
 142. Id. at 95. 
 143. The rule requires courts to consider the past care-taking arrangements in determining 
custody.  While facially appealing, this approach may lead to unintended consequences by 
placing primary caretaking responsibilities with the less capable parent, thus unintentionally 
undermining the best interests of the child.  See Riggs, supra note 108, at 490: 
However, the approximation rule is flawed and incomplete.  Until a better alternative that 
is more consistent with the developmental research is developed, the best interests 
standard may be the courts’ only reasonable guideline.  After all, the imprecise nature of 
the best interests standard accurately reflects the complex nature of the human family, 
which is always unique and ever changing, making it highly unlikely that a universal 
standard can be developed that will be appropriate for all cases at all points of time in the 
individual and family life cycles. 
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Both model approaches reject custody by presumption.  Presumptions 
favoring either the mother or the father clearly left drafters uneasy.  So they 
were jettisoned in favor of a gender-blind caretaker focused application of the 
BICS.144  This approach affords flexibility to courts in matters of custody to 
achieve the governmental interest of protecting and advancing the child’s 
welfare based on the existing circumstances of each case. 
B. The BICS Critiqued 
Despite attempts to promote uniformity, the BICS is often criticized as 
malleable,145 too easily manipulated, and subject to judicial whim.  Some 
might even characterize the standard as an excuse for the state to interfere in 
private family matters, rarely advancing the welfare of the child.  Despite the 
broad discretion afforded to courts and the potential for misuse, the 
aspirational goal of the BICS to advance the rights and welfare of the child 
should not be ignored.  Family law scholars Henry Foster and Doris Freed 
write: 
At least to some measure, the central problem has been, and still is, that in 
custody cases there is no substitute for hard and meticulous fact-finding by the 
trial court.  The great jurists who have had something to say about child 
custody have recognized this and have avoided over-generalization and 
absolutes.146 
The BICS identifies and protects the underlying fundamental right enjoyed by 
a child to continue loving and nurturing parent-like relationships.  Despite its 
weaknesses, the BICS remains the best alternative available in custody 
disputes due to its fact-driven focus. 147 
 
 144. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, No. 1281, 1986 WL 12951, at *5 (Ohio App. 
Nov. 17, 1986) (Grey, J., dissenting) (favoring restoring custody with mother consistent with the 
tender years presumption, now “couched in modern day jargon of ‘primary care giver’”). 
 145. Riggs, supra note 108, at 489; see also Robert Mnookin & R. Szwed, The Best Interests 
Syndrome and the Allocation of Power in Child Care, in PROVIDING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR 
CHILDREN 8 (H. Geach & E. Szwed, eds., 1983) (criticizing the BICS as “flawed because what is 
“best for any child . . . is often indeterminate and speculative and requires a highly individualized 
choice between alternatives”); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the 
Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987) (criticizing the BICS as indeterminate, unjust, litigious and 
subject to public policy concerns); Pamela Laufer-Ukles, Selective Recognition of Gender 
Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 19 (2008) 
(complaining the BICS considerations are “extremely broad and allow for the expression of 
particular judicial prejudice”). 
 146. Foster & Freed, supra note 10, at 331.  The approaches listed supra note 115 may, in 
fact, be described as an unsatisfactory substitute for “meticulous fact-finding.” Id. 
 147. See Elster, supra note 145, at 39–43 (explaining some alternatives include awarding 
custody to the primary caretaker in all instances, awarding custodians equal time, or flipping a 
coin). 
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III.  TENSION BETWEEN THE CHILD’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A LOVING AND 
NURTURING PARENT-LIKE RELATIONSHIP AND THE FAMILY 
PRIVACY/PARENTAL PRESUMPTION 
The common law doctrine of family privacy, like the BICS, is arguably 
rooted in the parens patriae authority of the state, transferred from the state to 
the husband/father as the leader of the family.148  Early American divorce law 
reveals this focus on the husband.  Property was divided by title, residency was 
determined by the husband, wages earned by wives and children belonged to 
the husband and father, corporal punishment of wives and children was legally 
permitted, and married women lacked the capacity to contract, and, thus, to 
manage their financial estates.149  The doctrine of family privacy is built upon 
this patriarchal foundation. 
The early constitutionalization of parental privacy recognized a parent’s 
right to bring up children without state interference,150 so long as the parent did 
not compromise the safety or welfare of the child.151  This early recognition of 
the unenumerated right to family privacy is a double-edged sword.  While 
guarding against the standardization of the family,152 it shields some parents 
from the consequences of poor parenting, fosters secret maltreatment, and 
ultimately undermines the welfare of some children.  State legislation limiting 
state oversight to monitor only unfit parents and their children entrenches the 
power of the parent without regard to the child’s best interests.153  The threat of 
the state’s intrusive arm reaching into matters of family decision-making must 
be balanced against the harm created by a rule of law enabling batterers to use 
the familial right of privacy to shield bullying and abusive behavior from state 
or private intervention—further entrenching a patriarchal order based on 
superior strength and intimidation.154  As the foundation of patriarchy ebbs, the 
related law and theory must likewise subside. 
 
 148. Jones v. West, 139 Tenn. 522, 526–27 (1925) (“Under the change of government from a 
monarchy to a republic, the functions of the parens patriae did not cease to exist.  Such authority 
passed from the king to the government of the state or sovereign people, and it may be called into 
exercise by the Legislature, the representatives of the people, and delegated by the Legislature to 
other functionaries.”).  
 149. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 447. 
 150. Wisconsion v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
 151. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).  Fathers historically risked losing 
children only upon failure to adequately train the child as a laborer. MASON, supra note 51, at 4. 
 152. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977). 
 153. Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 995, 1001 
(1992).  Dailey notes that “the law in areas as diverse as criminal, estate law, taxation, insurance 
law, labor law, contract law, tort law, and property law, indirectly, but profoundly, affect the 
structure of family law.”  Id. at 1001–02. 
 154. Id. at 1016–17. 
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One of the foundational principles of family privacy is the presumption 
that the parent will act in the best interests of the child.155  Its source may be 
traced to the decision of Meyer v. Nebraska, in which the court recognized the 
parental right to educate children in German.156  In Meyer, the Court reversed 
the conviction of a teacher who violated the English-only education statute as 
an unconstitutional violation of the parents’ “liberty interest to establish a 
home and bring up children.”157  Twenty-one years later, the Court upheld a 
statute prohibiting children from selling pamphlets on the street against a 
challenge by the child’s aunt and custodian.158  While recognizing that the 
“custody, care and nurture of the child resides first with the parents whose 
primary function and freedom include preparations for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder,” the Court also acknowledged the overriding interest 
of the state to protect the welfare of the child.159  Thus, by recognizing the 
competing interests of the parent, the state, and the child, Prince is one of the 
earliest Supreme Court cases to recognize the separate existence of the child’s 
rights and interests.  From the broad language of parental control in Meyer, 
tempered only slightly by the explicit recognition of the child as a stakeholder 
in Prince, the presumption that parents act in the best interests of a child, 
shielded from examination by the veil of family privacy, emerged as an 
unenumerated constitutional right.160 
The presumption is often used to justify the state’s doctrine of non-
intervention.  For example in HL v. Matheson, Justice Stevens observed: 
My conclusion, in this case and in Danforth, that a state legislature may 
rationally decide that most parents will, when informed of their daughter’s 
pregnancy, act with her welfare in mind is consistent with the “pages of human 
experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests” 
relied upon by the Court in Parham v. J. R.  It is also consistent with Justice 
Brennan’s opinion in Parham, which I joined. 
  As the Court noted in Parham, the presumption that parents act in the best 
interests of their children may be rebutted by “experience and reality.”  
However, when parents decide to surrender custody of their child to a mental 
hospital and thereby destroy the ongoing family relationship, that very decision 
raises an inference that parental authority is not being exercised in the child’s 
best interests.161 
 
 155. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 156. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 159. Id. at 167.  Although the adult involved was an aunt, not a parent, the court framed its 
rule in terms of parental rights. 
 160. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000). 
 161. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 424 (1981) (internal citations omitted). 
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Thus, in matters dealing with the separation of the unitary family, even when 
fit parents are involved, the parental presumption may be an unreliable one. 
Nevertheless, the presumption typically survives in third-party custody 
disputes unless the parent is deemed unfit.162 The definition of parental fitness 
is typically satisfied absent evidence of neglect or abuse.163  Thus, the 
intervention often occurs too late to protect the child’s best interests or to 
preserve meaningful relationships.164  In fact, once a parent is deemed unfit, 
children are often removed and parental rights terminated in accordance with 
state and federal law.165  If in every disputed custody matter, the child is 
entitled a BICS determination, and the child’s right to have a relationship with 
loving and nurturing parent-like adults is honored, then the standard of care is 
raised and relationships are preserved.  While fit parents certainly enjoy a 
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children,166 it 
follows that children enjoy a corollary: A fundamental right to be loved and 
nurtured by parent-like adults.167 
 
 162. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979). 
 163. In 2006, the most recent year with statistics available at the time of writing this Article, 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration of Children, Youth and 
Families, reported that 867,253 children were reported as abused or neglected within the United 
States.  Such data, concerning child abuse and neglect, is available from the National Data and 
Analysis System.  NDAS: Data Reports, http://ndas.cwla.org/data_stats/access/predefined/home. 
asp?MainTopicID=1&SubTopicID=68 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). 
 164. James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of 
Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 408–09 (2008). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (describing the “primary role” of 
parents in raising their children as “an enduring American tradition”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing a “private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing the right of parents to bring up 
their children “as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”). 
 167. Another option explored by Kevin Frankel is to extend the presumption that a parent acts 
in the best interests of a child to include extended family members, thus eliminating the BICS 
from the determination of foster placement.  Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Due Process 
Right to Family Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 
COL. J. LAW & SOC. PROBS. 301, 328 (2007).  The use of presumptions favoring family 
caretakers suffers from the same weakness as does the parental presumption: It fails to consider 
the child’s fundamental right to preserve existing loving and nurturing parent-like relationships. 
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Child
ParentState
A. The Weakness of the Family Privacy/Parental Presumption Approach 
The family privacy/parental presumption does not sufficiently protect the 
child’s rights.  The weakness of this presumption may be visualized as a Venn 
diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The very center of the diagram represents the unitary family when the interests 
of the parents, child, and state are in harmony.  The three intersecting circles 
demonstrate that while the three interests may sometimes be perfectly aligned, 
the interests of one, two, or all interested entities more often diverge—
challenging the presumption that the interests of the parent, child, and state are 
identical and may be adequately advanced by the family privacy/parental 
presumption without state intrusion. 
Although there is recent statistical evidence preferring biological parents as 
caretakers,168 the presumption that all parents will consistently act in the best 
interests of the child lacks support in social science research.  Parenting skills 
do not develop naturally because they are not innate; rather they must be 
learned.169  And the absence of a sound parental role model, along with the 
stress of raising a child, can cripple the learning process.170  Thus, the family 
privacy doctrine can isolate the family rather than empowering it, resulting in a 
cycle of poor parenting that spans generations.171  But the Supreme Court 
persistently applies the family privacy presumption, foreclosing the custody 
and visitation claims of those already serving in parent-like roles: Those who 
have formed an attachment, those who can best care for the child, and those 
 
 168. See Patricia G. Schnitzer & Bernard G. Ewigman, Child Deaths Resulting from Inflicted 
Injuries: Household Risk Factors and Perpetrator Characteristics, 116 PEDIATRICS 687, 687 
(2005) (“Children residing in households with unrelated adults were nearly 50 times as likely to 
die of inflicted injuries than children residing with 2 biological parents . . .  Children in 
households with a single parent and no other adults in residence had no increased risk of inflicted-
injury death . . .”). 
 169. Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. 
REV. 569, 594 (1992).  But see, e.g., W. Bradford Wilson & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing up 
Baby: Adoption, Marriage, and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
883, 904 (2006) (“[S]tudies suggest that children are significantly more likely to be abused or 
neglected in a household headed by a cohabiting couple than a household headed by a single 
parent.”). 
 170. McMullen, supra note 169, at 595. 
 171. Id. 
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who can best model parenting skills for the next generation.  These cross-
generational negative consequences demonstrate that the family privacy 
presumption is failing children.172 
The most startling examples of the family privacy/parental presumption at 
work arise in parentage cases in which the natural father is relegated to third-
party status as a result.  In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,173 the Court upheld the 
statutory presumption that a child born to a married woman is legitimate and 
trumps the natural father’s right to continue a close relationship with his 
biological child.174  This presumption is rebuttable only by the parents.175  
Similarly, in Lehr v. Robertson,176 the natural father’s custodial rights were 
terminated because he did not assert his rights by filing a postcard with the 
paternity registry in a timely fashion.177 
The dissenters in Lehr178 and Michael H.179 recognized that the 
presumption parents will act in the best interests of their children is helpful 
only in cases where the interests of parents and children do not conflict.  It is 
wholly inappropriate in cases where these interests might diverge.  In the 
biology-plus cases, the Supreme Court instructs that “biology alone does not 
give rise to parental rights, but requires a relationship more enduring.”180  But 
even considering evidence of an enduring relationship181 and of fraudulent 
interference,182 the Supreme Court majority applied the family privacy/parental 
presumption without considering the child’s relationship rights. 
Although both of the foregoing cases addressed parental status and are 
distinguishable from third-party custody cases, they remain instructive.183  In 
 
 172. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979): 
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child 
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s 
difficult decisions.  More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of 
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 
  As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the 
law accepts as a starting point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to 
this. 
 173. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 174. Id. at 120. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 177. Id. at 250–51. 
 178. Id. at 268–70 (White, J., dissenting). 
 179. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 180. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260. 
 181. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136 (1989). 
 182. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. 
 183. This tension is further illustrated by the cases in which the high courts in Illinois, 
Michigan, and New Mexico preferred a biological parent’s claim over the third-party adoptive 
parents’ claims due to procedural errors in the adoption process without applying the BICS.  See 
In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994); DeBoer v. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993); Roth 
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both cases, a child was denied a hearing under the BICS to determine whether 
a parent-like relationship should be allowed to develop, as in the case of Lehr, 
or to continue, as in the case of Michael H.  By casting the dispute as between 
legal parents and third parties, the Court denied both children a voice in the 
outcome.  In such cases, the family privacy/parental presumption fails children 
when the interests of the legally recognized parent and the child diverge. 
B. Scholarly Critique of the Family Privacy/Parental Presumption Approach 
Margaret Brinig, a scholar exploring the boundaries of family privacy in 
relationship to autonomy, writes about the legal disenfranchisement of 
children.184  In considering the Supreme Court precedent treating the right to 
family intimacy as the property of parents only, Brinig suggests that the Court 
deprives children of participation and personhood rights in life-altering custody 
determinations.185  In considering the focus upon parental rights secured by 
presumption and the protective veil of family privacy, Professor Brinig 
observed, “I have been wondering whether the court might not have reached 
the end of this trajectory and returned to celebrating the intimate relationships 
as opposed to the rights, particularly reinforcing relationships between parent 
and child.”186  Brinig finds encouragement in the recent Supreme Court 
decisions recognizing that “in families with children, the children’s interests do 
need to be considered, and will not always mirror their parents.”187  Difficulty 
arises, however, when courts attempt to identify the competing interests and 
calibrate the scale to weigh them.188  Even if the Court has refocused 
constitutional attention on the parent-child relationship, when parents and 
children disagree, it fails to give trial courts clear guidance to resolve these 
conflicts. 
 
v. Bookert, 894 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995).  Other courts, however, are moving toward a best interests 
analysis in parentage cases as well.  See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 137, at 139: 
In 2004, the California Supreme Court held that when multiple adults qualify as potential 
parents, based either on biology or past caregiving, judges should simply choose among 
them “weighing considerations of policy and logic” in determining the most “appropriate” 
parent.  This amounts of course to assigning parenthood based upon a “best interests of 
the child” finding, much like the standard used in parent-versus-parent custody 
disputes . . . . 
(citing In re Jesusa V., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 218–19 (Cal. 2004)). 
 184. Margaret Brinig, From Family to Individual and Back Again, 51 HOW. L.J. 1, 4–5 
(2007). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 3. 
 187. Id. at 14. 
 188. Id. at 13 n.80 (“While our vocabulary of rights has ample ways of resolving conflicts 
between an individual right-holder and the state, it has no way of resolving such conflicts 
between rights holders.”) (quoting Carl Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 879, 906 (1992)). 
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The creation of a parent-centered privacy interest in the care and custody 
of a child, by definition, results in the diminution of the child’s right to 
autonomy.189  Martha Fineman suggested that this “ideology of non-
intervention is rooted in idealization, but also references the perceived 
pragmatics of family relationships and the acknowledged limitations of legal, 
particularly judicial systems, as substitutes for family decision-making.”190  
Specifically, in relationship to the privacy of the parent-child relationship, 
Fineman observes: 
 The privacy of the parent-child relationship has also occupied the attention of 
state courts.  Parental conduct, be it discipline or decision-making, is generally 
protected unless it constitutes abuse or neglect of the child.  Courts 
consistently reiterate the common law presumption that parents act in the best 
interest of their children.  The legal construct of the family is based upon the 
presumption that “parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, 
and capacity for judgment.”191 
Other scholars have also recognized the dangers inherent in the idealization of 
the parent and child relationship, emphasizing the disparate treatment of child 
abusers within the criminal justice system.192  While a stranger will be 
criminally prosecuted for child abuse,193 a parent who abuses a child is far 
more likely to receive therapeutic intervention.194  Moreover, strangers face 
more stringent criminal sanctions and are convicted at a much higher rates.195  
Thus, the idealized fiction that parents will always treat their children as 
fiduciaries is false and places children at risk without the certainty of swift 
consequences when abuse occurs.  Recognizing that parents, as a group, may 
be more likely than not to act in the best interests of the child does not justify 
 
 189. Dailey, supra note 153, at 955, 987–91 (suggesting limitation of child’s liberty interest is 
justified due to child’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment and protects the child’s 
future liberty interest).  Dailey advocates a shift in focus to the family as a public institution 
“subject to state regulation and public control.”  Id.  She also advocates the adoption of 
“heightened scrutiny” to analyze laws that impact the family but she postpones the determination 
of what constitutes “just” family relations for a later day.  Id. at 994, 1029 n.262, 1031. 
 190. Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1207, 1214 (1999). 
 191. Id. at 1215 (footnotes omitted). 
 192. Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice 
System’s Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131, 166 (2007). 
 193. Id. at 144. 
 194. Id. at 141. 
 195. Id. at 151 (“Police referred 79% of the cases involving stranger perpetrators to the 
[district attorney]’s office compared to only 52% of the cases involving parent/stepparent alleged 
offenders. . . . [I]f prosecuted, [parents] often received little or no incarceration and surprisingly 
short periods of probation.” (quoting Delores D. Stroud, Sonja L. Martens & Julia Barker, 
Criminal Investigation of Child Sexual Abuse: A Comparison of Cases Referred to the Prosecutor 
to Those Not Referred, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 689, 694, 697 (2000))). 
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the parental presumption, which is based upon this idealized stereotype and 
exposes some children to harm. 
The weakness of this presumption is further illustrated in the most recent 
wave of BICS reform in Florida and other states.196  The movement toward 
parenting plans197 is designed to focus on the shared enterprise of raising 
children.  The new statutory language, however, contains provisions designed 
to improve the parents’ behavior by prohibiting parents from abusing drugs or 
alcohol, abusing the child, or interfering with the other parent’s access to the 
child.198 The bulk of the plan is designed to curb recurrent parental conflicts by 
requiring the parents to compromise when schedule changes are requested, to 
consider the child’s needs before their own, to refrain from criticizing the 
former spouse in the presence of the child, and to avoid discussing custody and 
divorce issues in the child’s presence.199  When a parental code of conduct is 
deemed necessary, shifting the focus from the BICS to grown-up disciplinary 
rules, the presumption that all parents act in the best interests of their children 
is severly undermined. 
In summary, the family privacy or parental presumption is often justified 
on the basis that most parents act in the best interests of their children; thus, 
state oversight is unnecessary and, perhaps, even unconstitutional.  
Unfortunately, this presumption is overinclusive, underinclusive, and 
irrational.  It is overinclusive because it sometimes favors neglectful parents.  
It is underinclusive because it often dismisses the custody claims of similarly 
situated parent-like adults.200  It fails children entirely by removing the BICS 
from the determination.  A case-by-case approach is typically required in every 
custody hearing.  Recognizing third-party standing arguably creates little 
additional administrative cost and advances a paramount state interest.  The 
parental presumption, used to summarily dispose of third-party custody cases, 
creates bad results for the child and bad legal precedent.  It should be discarded 
in exchange for a careful review of the facts of each custody case according to 
 
 196. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.046(13) (West 2009). 
 197. According to the Florida statute, a “parenting plan” means a document created to govern 
the relationship between the parties relating to the decisions that must be made regarding the 
minor child and shall contain a time-sharing schedule for the parents and child. The issues 
concerning the minor child may include, but are not limited to, the child’s education, healthcare, 
and physical, social, and emotional well being. In creating the plan, all circumstances between the 
parties, including the parties’ historic relationship, domestic violence, and other factors must be 
taken into consideration. The parenting plan shall be developed and agreed to by the parents and 
approved by a court or, if the parents cannot agree, established by the court.  Id. 
 198. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, § 2.11. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Permitting third-party actions is unlikely to lead to a wave of added litigation because 
only those who can allege facts demonstrating a loving and nurturing parent-like relationship can 
survive summary judgment. 
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the BICS.  For the same reasons courts rejected determining the merits of 
custody disputes by presumption, preferring instead the BICS, preference for 
legal and biological parents as custodians should, likewise, be discarded in 
favor of proceeding according to the BICS in third-party custody actions. 
C. The Recognition of Parental Rights to the Exclusion of the Child’s 
Fundamental Right to a Loving and Nurturing Parent-Like Relationship 
Protected by the BICS Is Out of Step with the World Community 
Despite the expanding list of fundamental rights enjoyed by American 
children, the United States is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.201  This leaves the United States at odds with the 
world consensus that children enjoy a fundamental right to have their best 
interests considered in matters related to their autonomy.202  Barbara 
Woodhouse suggested that the United States’ reluctance to sign the 
Convention could be attributed to the vestiges of the child as property 
tradition: 
  The tenacious power of this property theory is not surprising.  The concept 
of human property, of which slavery was the most notorious vestige, has 
ancient roots. The notion of children as their father’s property flowed naturally 
from the story of procreation as told by a patrilineal society; according to the 
ancients, it was the father’s “seed” which, once planted in the mother’s womb, 
grew into his likeness within the woman’s body.  Flesh of their father’s flesh, 
children rightly belonged to the patriarch, to be worked, traded and given in 
marriage in exchange for money.203 
Woodhouse further notes, “Of all the rights of the child, the child’s right to 
be raised by a loving parent is surely the linchpin.”204  The Convention protects 
this right and requires the state to balance the rights of the child against those 
of the parent when such rights conflict.205  The Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
recognize the substantive due process right of the child to a BICS in cases of 
custody and visitation may be linked to the traditional child as property 
precedent, reinforced by the rigid family privacy doctrine. 
 
 201. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, 
at 165, U.N. Doc. A/44 736 (1989) [hereinafter CRC]; Susan Kilbourne, US Failure to Ratify the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with Children’s Rights, 6 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 437, 438 (1996). 
 202. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parent’s Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313 (1998).  See also 
Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Third Committee, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). [hereinafter Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child] (“[T]he best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.”). 
 203. Woodhouse, supra note 202, at 313. 
 204. Id. at 316. 
 205. Id. at 318. 
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The European Community continues to expand the protection afforded to 
the family and to children, particularly.  In determining whether a pediatrician 
owed a common law duty to both the parents as well as to the child patient in a 
child-protection action under Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights, the court ruled that when “the child’s interests are 
in potential conflict with the interests of the parents . . . . we consider that there 
are cogent reasons of public policy for concluding that, where child care 
decisions are being taken, no common law duty of care should be owed to the 
parents.”206  This case, with its recognition of the child’s right to a best 
interests analysis, is but one example of the international focus on the rights of 
the child specifically. 
In 1989, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC).207  The CRC is a comprehensive statement of the civil and 
economic rights of the child.  Article 3 of the CRC provides, “in all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” 208  Although 189 
nations have ratified the CRC, the United States has not.209 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT TREATMENT OF BICS LEADS TO STATE 
COURT CONFUSION 
The Supreme Court has yet to expressly recognize the BICS as protecting a 
child’s fundamental right to a loving and nurturing parent-like relationship.  
The foundation for such recognition, however, has been laid.  Thus far, the 
Court has recognized that children enjoy other fundamental rights, such as the 
right to education,210 procedural and substantive due process,211 freedom of 
speech,212 search and seizure protections,213 abortion214 and healthcare 
decision-making.215  The state has a compelling state interest in protecting 
 
 206. Lawrence v. Pembrokeshire CC, EWHC 1029 (QB) (2006). 
 207. U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989). 
 208. Id. at Art. 3. 
 209. Susan Kilbourne, supra note 201, at 488.  Critics within the United States oppose the 
transfer of parental authority to the state, vesting rights in children that suggest children may 
eschew parental guidance and the potential sanction of parents who violate these rights.  Id.  
While 189 states ratified, only the United States, the Cook Islands, Switzerland and Somalia 
failed to ratify this convention.  Id. at 437. 
 210. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 211. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967). 
 212. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 213. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985). 
 214. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1979). 
 215. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 584–85. (1979). 
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children from abuse and neglect,216 justifying state termination of a parent’s 
fundamental right to the care and custody of a child.217  Even though children 
undergo a gradual maturation process, minority status should not deprive them 
of the most basic associational rights enjoyed by all citizens.  Regarding these 
nascent and evolving rights that reach fruition upon the age of majority,218 one 
scholar notes: 
  As the child grows older . . . the value of parental control weakens, as it 
confronts a conflicting value.  Children must . . . also develop a capacity for 
autonomous action within existing norms.  A child who does not learn to make 
choices within our cultural framework is plainly unable to perform the adult 
role in society.219 
The expanding list of fundamental rights possessed by minors suggests a trend 
toward greater legal respect and protection.  Certainly, a child’s right to 
continue valued parental and parent-like relationships is entitled to 
constitutional protection.  It is time for legislators and courts to recognize that 
the constitutional protection surrounding the family includes the child’s right 
to continue loving and nurturing parent-like relationships, among other 
fundamental rights.220 
 
 216. While a child’s right to be free from abuse and neglect has been recognized as a 
compelling state interest, and as fundamental under California’s constitution, the right has not yet 
been specifically recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court.  See Conley v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1126, 1132 (2000) (holding the 
compelling state interest in protecting children from child abuse justified any burden on the 
pastor’s religious practice).  The state interest, however, has been characterized as a compelling 
one, thus justifying the removal of a child from the custody of a neglectful or abusive parent, and 
in some cases, the termination of parental rights.  Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s 
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1986) (arguing inconsistent treatment of minors in matters 
related to marriage, the commission of crimes, the age to both vote and contract creates a theory 
of variable competencies without a coherent rational). 
 219. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights and the Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 799, 821, 819–23 (1999).  While the BICS and the child’s preference may not always 
coincide, the child’s preference is entitled to consideration. Cynthia Starnes, Swords in the Hands 
of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After Troxel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 115, 121 (2003).  With 
respect to the relationship between the child’s age and the importance of the child’s preference, 
the ALI has recommended accommodating the preferences of older children. See ALI 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, § 2.08 (“[T]he court should accommodate the firm preferences of a 
child who has reached a specific age.”). 
 220. For the constitutional protection surrounding family relationships, see DWYER, supra 
note 1, at 105 (“Legislative bodies and courts throughout the western world have recognized [the 
importance of personal relationships] in affording constitutional protection to family 
relationships.”).  See also Stanely v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (recognizing “the 
important interests of both parent and child” in holding the biological father has a Constitutional 
right to judicial consideration regarding his fitness for child custody). 
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A. Supreme Court Treatment of the BICS 
The Supreme Court has described the BICS in a variety of ways.  For 
example, in Palmore v. Sidoti,221 the Court described “the goal of granting 
custody based on the best interests of the child” as a “substantial governmental 
interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.”222  In reviewing the trial 
court’s reliance upon the threat of discriminatory future treatment the child 
might receive because her white mother married a black man, the Supreme 
Court was asked to assess whether the state’s interest in protecting the child 
from the threat of societal scorn through the application of a racially 
discriminatory criteria was sufficiently tailored for constitutional purposes.223  
This allowed the Court to address the correct standard of review to apply to 
BICS challenges.224  The Court characterized the state’s interest in protecting 
the child as “substantial,” rather than compelling.225  Thus, the Court expressly 
rejected the trial court’s custody determination as it had relied exclusively 
upon impermissible racial classifications.226 
Perhaps the Palmore Court deemed its characterization of the BICS as 
“indisputably a substantial government interest,” rather than a compelling 
government interest, as essential in order to reverse the trial court’s unjustified 
reliance upon racial bias.227  The Court cited no authority in support of its 
choice to characterize the state’s interest as merely “substantial,” rather than 
compelling.228  It instead preferred to entirely foreclose any future question of 
using racial criteria to determine custody disputes.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision to equate the BICS with furthering substantial state interests, rather 
than compelling interests, curiously ignored the underlying Florida state court 
precedent characterizing the best interests of the child as “paramount,” and “of 
the utmost importance,”229 words typically associated with a compelling state 
 
 221. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 222. Id. at 433.  Palmore can be read narrowly to characterize the state’s interest in the best 
interests of the child as substantial only in relationship to the equal protection claim raised by 
mother, leaving open the question of whether a child enjoys the fundamental right to have the 
court apply the BICS in any custody or visitation case. 
 223. Id. at 431–32. 
 224. Id. at 431. 
 225. Id. at 433. 
 226. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.  See also, Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 352 (2003) 
(citing Palmore for proposition that “even the best interests of a child did not constitute a 
compelling state interest that would allow a state court to award custody to the father because the 
mother was in a mixed-race marriage”). 
 227. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See, e.g., Seibert v. Seibert, 436 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“[T]hat 
the issue of child custody is still subject to determination based upon the paramount consideration 
of the best interest of the children.”); Grooms v. Harvey, 418 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982) (“[T]he best interest and the ultimate welfare of the child are paramount over the ‘rights’ of 
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interest.230  The Palmore Court could have recognized the state’s interest in 
advancing the best interests of the child to be compelling and still have 
reversed the trial court because the state’s reliance upon race as a factor was 
insufficiently narrowly tailored in relationship to the BICS given the absence 
of any evidence linking parenting ability to race.  This alternative reasoning 
seems preferable because it both recognizes the fundamental nature of the 
child’s relationship interests and rejects race as a sufficiently compelling basis 
upon which to determine custody. 
In Santosky v. Kramer,231 the Supreme Court addressed the degree of 
constitutional protection that must be afforded to a parent in a termination 
proceeding with respect to the evidentiary standard.232  The New York 
Appellate Court affirmed the legislation requiring a preponderance standard: 
  The sole contention upon this appeal is that section 622 of the Family 
Court Act is unconstitutional because the standard of proof required by the 
statute, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is so low that it deprives them of 
due process of law.  In Matter of Anthony L.L., this court held that the level of 
proof required by section 622 was constitutional.  In adhering to our decision, 
we note that the permanent neglect statute recognizes and seeks to balance 
rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents.  Accordingly, 
application of the preponderance of evidence standard in such a proceeding 
involving these often conflicting rights is proper and constitutional.233 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the state must prove a 
parent unfit by clear and convincing evidence in a termination proceeding.234  
Dissenting Justices Rehnquist, White, and O’Conner recognized the state’s 
interest in protecting the child to be urgent, and rejected the majority’s 
authority to supplant the legislature’s evidentiary rule with its own skewed 
standard to protect parental rights. 235 
The Santosky majority invalidated state legislation designed to balance the 
interests of the parent, the child, and the state, with instructions that parental 
rights require preferential treatment.236  Although the case does not expressly 
 
the other parties to the proceeding.”); Delancey v. Booth, 400 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 5th 1981) (“The paramount consideration in . . . a custody determination, of course, is the 
best interest of the child . . . .”). 
 230. A more satisfying analysis might have balanced the interests of each parent, the child’s 
best interests, and the state’s obligation to eradicate state-sanctioned racial discrimination.  While 
the outcome would likely remain unchanged, balancing the competing constitutional interests 
more accurately reflects the rights at stake and the court’s reasoning process. 
 231. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 232. Id. 
 233. In re John AA, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (citations omitted). 
 234. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. 
 235. Id. at 766. 
 236. Id. at 767. 
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address the right of the child to be raised by loving parents,237 it raises the 
question of when, if ever, the state may elevate the relational rights of children 
to at least the same level of constitutional protection enjoyed by the parents. 
In construing the Santosky Court’s characterizations of the BICS as serving 
substantial or, alternatively, urgent interests, the Supreme Court in Reno v. 
Flores238 noted: 
  “The best interests of the child” is likewise not an absolute and exclusive 
constitutional criterion for the government’s exercise of the custodial 
responsibilities that it undertakes, which must be reconciled with many other 
responsibilities.239 
In this passage, the Court characterized the BICS as one, among numerous 
constitutional criteria, justifying the state’s assertion of custodial power over a 
child. 
Palmore, Santosky, and Reno demonstrate that a majority of the Supreme 
Court is not yet ready to recognize that the BICS affords both justification to 
recognize the relational rights of children and a means of balancing these rights 
in relationship to those asserted by fit parents.  In this way, the Court 
anticipates and negates the criticism that courts should not be in the business of 
measuring the quality of a child’s potential home, schooling, or healthcare 
against a hypothetical “best” scenario.240  At the same time, a bright-line rule 
protecting legal and biological parental decision-making is unworkable when 
the interests of the parents and the child diverge.  The bright-line test also fails 
children when a parent-like third party’s claim is dismissed on standing 
grounds.  In contrast, application of the BICS affords to the parents and the 
child an in-depth factual determination of the best result for the child under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the hearing. 
Palmore, Santosky, and Reno raise the following question: When, if ever, 
does the application of the BICS advance the state’s substantial or even 
compelling interests which, if appropriately narrowly tailored, may justify state 
limitation of a parent’s custodial rights?  To date, the Supreme Court has, 
perhaps purposefully, avoided answering the question and created confusion 
by characterizing the BICS as related to “substantial interests,” “urgent 
interests,” and “one among numerous constitutional criteria,” depending upon 
the nature of the state action at issue.241  In this way, the Court avoids 
expressly acknowledging that the BICS recognizes and protects a child’s 
fundamental relationship rights. 
 
 237. See supra note 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 238. 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
 239. Id. at 304. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Palmore v. Sidoti 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 746; Reno, 507 U.S. 
at 301–02. 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s deference to parental autonomy and family 
privacy, the strong voice of dissent illuminates an alternative analysis that 
recognizes the child as a stakeholder and party possessing a corollary 
fundamental relationship right protected by the BICS, designed to achieve the 
compelling state interest of protecting the child’s welfare.242  Justice Brennan, 
joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, gave voice to the child’s liberty 
interest by characterizing the relationship at interest in Michael H. as 
belonging to both the natural father and the child—noting that the majority’s 
“pinched conception of ‘the family,’ crucial as it is in rejecting Michael and 
Victoria’s claim of a liberty interest, is jarring in light of our many cases 
preventing the States from denying important interests or statuses to those 
whose situations do not fit the government’s narrow view of the family.”243 
The rights of a parent and the rights of a child collided again in a 2003 
case.  The Supreme Court, in Troxel v. Granville,244 revealed division among 
the justices regarding whether the BICS standard constitutes a sufficiently 
compelling state interest to subordinate parental rights.245  The Court 
invalidated the Washington state visitation statute because it was too broad and 
permitted any person to file a claim for visitation.246  Additionally, the statute 
violated a fit parent’s due process right to control the care and upbringing of a 
child by failing to grant special weight to the parental decision to deny 
visitation rights to third parties,247 thus shifting the burden to the parent to 
disprove that visitation would be in the child’s best interest.248  Many state 
court decisions describe the best interests of the child as paramount,249 
 
 242. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136 (1989). 
 243. Id. at 145. 
 244. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 245. Id. at 59.  Justice Stevens dissented and argued, “The constitutional protection against 
arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be extended to prevent the States from 
protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated 
by an interest in the welfare of the child.” Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 67 (majority opinion). 
 247. Id. at 68–69. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Warmuth v. Koski, No. A07-1350, 2008 WL 4224470, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 
2008) (“[T]he court’s ‘paramount commitment’ is to the best interests of the child.”); In re BTW, 
195 P.3d 896, 908 (Okla. 2008) (“[T]he paramount consideration remains the best interest of the 
child.”); In re Marriage of Reed, No. 99,392, 191 P.3d 1136 (Table), 2008 WL 4239036, at *3 
(Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2008) (“[T]he paramount consideration . . . is the . . .  best interests of 
the child.”).  See also Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Third Committee, G.A. Res. 
1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959): 
The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by 
law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, 
spiritually, and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and 
dignity.  In the enactment of laws for his purpose, the best interests of the child shall be 
the paramount consideration. 
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primary,250 and of the utmost importance.251  The Troxel plurality relegated the 
BICS to a secondary status, subordinating the right of a child to have custody 
and visitation claims determined by the BICS to the right of a fit parent to the 
“care, custody, and management”252 of a child. 
The Troxel plurality agreed that the Washington state statute, embracing 
the BICS standard to determine a visitation claim brought by any persons, 
violated a fit parent’s fundamental right to control the custody and visitation 
rights of third parties in relationship to a child.253  The Court failed, however, 
to consider the question of whether the child had a parallel fundamental right 
to protect existing parent-like relationships and how best to honor this right. 
Some scholars have praised the Troxel Court’s restraint, demonstrated by 
its narrow holding, limited to its facts.254  For example, David Meyer describes 
Troxel as adopting a standard short of strict scrutiny to analyze third-party 
custody statutes.255  An alternative reading leads to a very different conclusion.  
In Troxel, the Supreme Court could be characterized as operating in its least 
legitimate zone by invalidating state legislation based on substantive due 
process principles without carefully identifying and analyzing competing rights 
and interests of all of the stakeholders, including the child’s rights.256  Such an 
analysis of ways and means requires at least a cursory review of the state’s 
asserted interests.  Typically, the BICS advances the welfare of children and 
protects the child’s fundamental interests.  Thus, Troxel might just as easily be 
 
 250. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 1. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62 (2000). 
 253. Id. at 75. 
 254. See Meyer, Lochner Redeemed, supra note 26, at 1150 (noting the Court’s restraint 
reflected a lack of confidence about the Court’s intervention into the family and the dread of a 
misstep).  See also id. at 1141 (“In this, crucially, the Justices seemed to be opening the door to a 
new, more flexible analysis that would permit the Court to balance the competing privacy 
interests of other family members—in much the same way that relaxed scrutiny in the abortion 
context permits the courts to take into account potentially conflicting private interests.”).  But see 
Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 
279, 323–24 (2000).  Buss writes that: 
Affording constitutional protection to parents’ control over the upbringing of their 
children means, at a minimum, that we should leave such associational decisions to 
parents.  If, on the other hand, we disapprove of affording parents such deference, then we 
should abandon the pretense of affording their decisions the protection of a fundamental 
right.  In embracing the right, while abandoning the deference, Troxel takes the authority 
for the sorting away from both parents and legislatures, leaving the courts with a mess 
they are ill equipped to clean up. 
Id. 
 255. See Meyer, Lochner Redeemed, supra note 26, at 1152 (“[T]he approaches followed by a 
majority of the Justices suggested that their failure to mention strict scrutiny was not a curious 
oversight, but an implicit rejection.”). 
 256. Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895) (White, J., dissenting). 
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characterized as an unsatisfactory opinion because it fails to identify the proper 
test to apply to third-party visitation claims.  Rather, the plurality invalidated 
the Washington statute because it failed to provide any weight to a fit parent’s 
child-rearing decision.257  By entirely foregoing the analysis of whether 
affording third-party standing might advance a child’s fundamental rights or 
whether the BICS itself constitutes a compelling state interest of the magnitude 
necessary to overcome a parent’s fundamental right to custody, Troxel raises 
more questions than it answers. 
By invalidating the Washington statute on the basis that it did not afford 
special consideration and weight to the parent’s wishes,258 without providing to 
courts and legislatures more specific guidance, the Troxel decision casts doubt 
on whether the best interests of the child may ever justify the award of custody 
or visitation to a third-party over a fit parent’s objection. While recognizing 
parental rights as fundamental, the plurality failed to appreciate the equally 
fundamental nature of the child’s relationship rights at stake.  Thus, the 
opinion ignores the fundamental right of a child to preserve existing loving and 
nurturing parent-like relationships, a right recognized and advanced by the 
BICS. 
The state court trends following Troxel suggest that, absent evidence that 
the court afforded special weight to the parent’s preference and required a 
showing of harm to the child if the third-party relationship is severed, the third-
party claim will be dismissed without regard to the BICS.  Although not 
mandated by the Troxel decision, the Court implied that the detriment standard 
satisfied constitutional muster.259  The question arises in third-party custody 
cases: May the BICS ever be substituted for the detriment standard?260  Is the 
child’s fundamental right to continue existing loving and nurturing parent-like 
relationships sufficiently weighty to subordinate a legal or biological parent’s 
fundamental due process right to deny third-party custody claims?  The Troxel 
Court’s failure to provide guidance regarding this question has left legislative 
 
 257. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 69–70. 
 258. Id. at 75. 
 259. The detriment standard emerged from the Washington Supreme Court ruling in Troxel, 
in which the court ruled the statute unconstitutional because it did not require a threshold showing 
that a parent’s visitation decision was harmful to the child and because the statute’s any person 
provision swept too broadly.  See generally, In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 2731  (Wash. 
1998) (holding the statute undermined parents’ “fundamental right to autonomy in child rearing 
decisions”).  The Supreme Court plurality reserved for another day “the primary constitutional 
question . . . [of] whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to 
include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting 
visitation.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
 260. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
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and judicial confusion across the nation.  The role of the BICS in third-party 
custody disputes, if any, is uncertain.261 
B. The Absence of Clear Supreme Court Precedent Recognizing the Child’s 
Fundamental Right to Continue Existing Loving and Nurturing Parent-
Like Relationships Creates Confusion and Disparate Results. 
Although describing the children’s best interests as the guiding “polestar,” 
of “utmost importance,” and “of paramount importance,” few state courts have 
expressly recognized that the child’s fundamental relationship rights are 
advanced and protected through application of the BICS.  The Troxel Court 
ignored the relationship of the BICS to the child’s constitutional rights.  Absent 
evidence of harm to the child or that a parent is unfit, the Court treated the 
BICS as irrelevant.  State courts have followed suit.  For example, in Roth v. 
Weston,262 the court invalidated the Oklahoma grandparent visitation statute 
because it did not require a showing of harm to the child or parental unfitness 
before the state could establish a sufficiently compelling interest to limit a 
parent’s fundamental rights.263  The Roth court rejected the BICS as a 
compelling state interest: 
  The constitutional issue, however, is not whether children should have the 
benefit of relationships with persons other than their parents or whether a judge 
considers that a parent is acting capriciously. In light of the compelling interest 
at stake, the best interests of the child are secondary to the parents’ rights.  
Otherwise, “[the best interest] standard delegates to judges authority to apply 
their own personal and essentially unreviewable lifestyle preferences to 
resolving each dispute.”264 
So instead of the BICS, the Roth court adopted the harm standard based on its 
reading of Troxel.265 
Similarly, in Rideout v. Riendeau,266 the Maine Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded a trial court decision dismissing the grandparent’s visitation 
claim and invalidating the Maine statute with instructions to hear the petition. 
267  The trial court invalidated the Maine custody statute because it failed to 
 
 261. See Solangel Maldonado, When Father or Mother Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents 
and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 881–82 (2003) (“Justice 
Kennedy recognized that, under certain circumstances, the BICS standard may be applied in a 
third party visitation dispute.”). 
 262. 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002). 
 263. Id. at 452–53. 
 264. Id. at 443–44 (internal citations omitted). 
 265. 789 A.2d 431, 444–45 (adopting Troxel’s rejection of judicial scrutiny of parental 
decisions, and but acknowledging that persons acting in a parent-type capacity for an extended 
period of time have stronger visitation rights). 
 266. 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000). 
 267. Id. at 301–02. 
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provide sufficient protection to parental due process rights.268  Reversing, the 
Maine Supreme Court ruled that even absent an allegation that a parent is unfit, 
the parent’s due process rights may be restricted if the state advances a 
compelling state interest and the intrusion is sufficiently narrowly tailored.269  
The court continued its analysis by expressly ruling that the best interests of 
the child do not alone constitute a compelling interest: 
  An element of “harm” in the traditional sense is not, however, the only 
compelling state interest extant when matters relating to the welfare of children 
are under scrutiny. For example, the State’s compelling interest in requiring 
school attendance or restricting child labor does not derive exclusively from 
the state’s interest in preventing “harm,” but instead stems from the State’s 
broader parens patriae interest in the well-being of the child. . . .  We agree 
with the trial court, however, that something more than best interests of the 
child must be at stake to establish a compelling state interest.270 
The Rideout court also reasoned that by characterizing the grandparents as 
“primary caregivers,” the resulting relationship might trigger the state’s 
“parens patriae authority on behalf of the child and provide a compelling basis 
for the state’s intervention in an intact family with fit parents.”271  The Rideout 
court expressly recognized that both a parent and a child may advance 
competing interests: “A parent’s fundamental liberty interest must be balanced 
against a ‘[child’s] interest . . . .’”272  So by characterizing the state’s interest in 
preserving a child’s right to continue parent-like relationships as compelling, 
the Maine statute survived constitutional review.273 
While the Maine Supreme Court reached the right result, perhaps it did so 
for the wrong reason.  It arrived at this outcome despite expressly ruling that 
something more than the best interests of the child is required to advance a 
sufficiently compelling state interest.  In reality, the child’s fundamental right 
to preserve parent-like relationships should prevail in a custody dispute, or at 
least be recognized and weighed against the legal or biological parent’s 
constitutional right to family privacy.  The haze surrounding the BICS lifts 
when it is understood that the child has a separate and fundamental right to 
continue existing parent-like relationships, and the BICS applies factors 
designed to identify the existence of such relationships and protects the child’s 
right to preserve them.  Clearly, the child is a direct stakeholder in the 
outcome.  In this manner, all third-party custody claims could be resolved by 
 
 268. Id. at 294. 
 269. Id. at 302. 
 270. Id. at 300–01. 
 271. 761 A.2d 291, 302 (Me. 2000). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
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considering the substantive due process relationship rights of both the parent 
and the child. 
Despite the cautionary rule of Troxel, other jurisdictions have not 
embraced the detriment standard and have permitted third-party visitation over 
a fit parent’s objection.  In Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services v. 
Paillet,274 the court ruled that the Kansas statute requiring the existence of a 
substantial relationship and a showing that visitation would further the best 
interests of the child satisfied constitutional muster.275  The court reached this 
conclusion without explanation: “Neither requirement is called into question 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel.”276 
Troxel also creates uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of 
recognizing quasi-parent standing under the guise of parent by estoppel or de 
facto parent, concepts embodied in the ALI Principles of Family Law.277  A 
number of recent cases have permitted third-party standing in reliance upon the 
ALI standard, or a similar standard, thus further clouding the proper 
application of Troxel.  For example, the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed a 
trial court’s decision to dismiss a married father’s custody claim for lack of 
standing after DNA established that he was not the father.278  The court 
reasoned that the relevant time for determining standing was at the time the 
presumption of fatherhood attached rather than the time following the court-
ordered DNA test.279  Thus, the court protected this third-party custody claim 
based upon the existing loving parent-like relationship.280 
A similar result was reached by a Virginia court, applying the BICS, in 
which the court granted standing in a custody dispute to a married father who 
raised a child as his own for three years despite knowing that he was not the 
biological father.281  Likewise, a New Jersey court ruled that once a third-party 
established “psychological parenthood,” then he or she “stands in parity” with 
 
 274. 16 P.3d 962, 971 (Kan. 2001). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 971.  See also, Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So.2d 798, 803–04 (Miss. 2001) (noting 
that the “best interest of the child” is a paramount consideration); West Virginia ex rel. Brandon 
L. v. D. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674, 684–85 (2001) (concluding that the two-pronged standard of best 
“interest of child and lack of substantial interference” with parents’ rights meets Troxel 
requirements). 
 277. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, § 2.18. 
 278. In re Marriage of Casey, 867 N.E.2d 555, 558–59 (Ill. App. 3d. 2007). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. O’Rourke v. Vuturo, 638 S.E.2d 124, 130–31 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); but see Janice M. v. 
Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 93 (Md. 2008) (reversing and remanding a grant of de facto parent 
standing with instructions that trial court must find either mother was unfit or “whether, based on 
all the facts, significant exceptional circumstances exist” to overcome mother’s due process 
liberty interest). 
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the legal parent.282  This survey of state case law demonstrates that some state 
courts continue to apply the BICS to third-party custody claims, despite Troxel.  
In these cases, the third-party assumed a parent-like relationship with the child, 
triggering the BICS. 
Post-Troxel third-party custody claims demonstrate the tension created 
when courts are forced to determine custody disputes between a parent and a 
third party.  The decision is particularly difficult if the third party enjoys a 
parent-like relationship with the child.  In fact, one court expressly relegated 
the child’s relationship right to a secondary status.283  The vague directive of 
Troxel creates confusion at the state level and devalues the fundamental 
relationship rights of the child. 
IV.  STATES PAVE THE WAY FOR RECOGNITION OF THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO A 
BICS DETERMINATION 
Some state court decisions endeavor to protect the constellation of 
fundamental relationship rights enjoyed by children, encompassed within the 
“liberty” principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.284  These courts have done 
so by characterizing the BICS as a compelling state interest,285 trumping the 
 
 282. P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780, 786 (N.J. 2004).  The court affirmed an award of custody to 
a neighbor where the psychological parent relationship arose with the consent of the parent, the 
third party and the child lived together, the third party assumed significant child-rearing 
obligations, and sufficient time had passed to establish a bonded relationship.  Id. at 781–82. 
 283. Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d, 291, 297 (Me. 2000) (holding the BICS is insufficient to 
intervene in the decision making of competent parents). 
 284. See, e.g., In re D.M.G., 951 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Mont. 1998) (quoting In re Marriage of 
Cole, 729 P.2d 1276, 1280–81 (Mont. 1986)); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 163 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that protection of the best interests of the child is a compelling 
state interest justifying depravation of fundamental right to travel, in order to raise one’s child); 
Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 615–16 (Wyo.1999): 
The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it the right of a custodial parent to 
have the children move with that parent. This right is not to be denied, impaired, or 
disparaged unless clear evidence before the court demonstrates another substantial and 
material change of circumstance and establishes a detrimental effect of the move upon the 
children. 
See also Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (“The law has few objectives 
more compelling than protecting the interests of children. Where families have suffered the 
trauma of divorce those interests include not only the care and custody of the child but its right 
and obligation to know and visit with a noncustodial parent.”);  Ziegler v. Ziegler, 691 P.2d 773, 
780 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (“Providing and assuring the maximum opportunities for parental love, 
guidance, support, and companionship is a compelling state interest that . . . warrants reasonable 
interference with the constitutional right of travel when necessary.”). 
 285. In re D.M.G., 951 P.2d at 1383 (quoting In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280–81 
(“[T]he best interests of a child . . . may constitute a compelling state interest worthy of 
reasonable interference with the right to travel interstate.”)); LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163; 
Clark, 489 N.E.2d at 100.  Throughout this paper, I have elected to characterize the BICS as 
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fundamental rights asserted by parents, even after the Troxel plurality 
decision286 
A. Pennsylvania’s Justice Newman Recognizes the BICS as a Fundamental 
Right. 
In Hiller v. Fausey,287 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Grandparent Visitation Act under the 
Troxel standard.288  Justice Newman wrote a separate concurrence, calling for 
the recognition of the BICS as a fundamental right belonging to every child 
involved in a custody, visitation, or termination proceeding.289  Justice 
Newman made the following call for change: 
  I join the well-reasoned opinion of the Majority in this matter but write 
separately to indicate the strength of my conviction that even greater 
movement in this area of children’s rights is required.  Security, continuity and 
stability in an ongoing custodial relationship, whether maintained with a 
biologic or adoptive parent and/or with a grandparent is vital to the successful 
personality development of a child.  The law finally needs to recognize that the 
child, as the focus in various types of proceedings, has the same inalienable 
rights to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness as an adult.  Therefore, I 
write to emphasize that it is time to regard the best interests of the child as a 
fundamental and momentous right.290 
Justice Newman’s eloquent words recognize that children, like adults, enjoy 
fundamental relationship rights. 
Justice Newman further recognized that when the constitutional rights of 
parents are implicated, the court must determine that the interference is 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest and then weigh the 
interests of the parties, including the state’s interest in ensuring the emotional 
and physical health of the its minor citizens.291  But primary weight must be 
given to the BICS.292  Justice Newman described the child’s fundamental 
rights to include the right to be “cared for by an adult who will provide 
protection, companionship and upbringing.”293 
 
furthering the child’s relationship rights, rather than as the fundamental right at issue. This is 
because I view the BICS as protecting and advancing the fundamental right at issue. 
 286. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 287. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006) (Newman, J., concurring). 
 288. Id. at 903. 
 289. Id. at 890–91. 
 290. Id. at 890–91. 
 291. Id. at 897. 
 292. Hiller, 904 A.2d at 898. 
 293. Id. at 897. 
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The opinion concludes by calling for courts and legislatures to give 
fundamental protection to the child’s right to a best interests of the child 
determination in any case dealing with children: 
  It is on this basis that I advocate that we finally legitimize the right of the 
child to have his or her best interests considered as a fundamental right. This 
interest is expressed in a variety of statutes and proceedings, ranging from the 
complete severance of parental rights on a judge’s finding of parental 
unfitness, to the limitation of parental choices in the areas, for example, of 
education, health care, and safety. Thus, I believe that the instant matter 
involves a situation that burdens two fundamental rights-the right of a fit father 
to make parenting decisions for the child and the right of the child to have its 
best interests considered. . . .  If any balancing of interests is necessary, the 
interests of the child must prevail.294 
This call for strict scrutiny to protect the rights of the child in custody 
disputes follows the lead of several other states, such as California, where 
courts have recognized the fundamental nature of the BICS.  In In re 
Bridget,295 a California court ruled: 
[A]s a matter of simple common sense, the rights of children in their family 
relationships are at least as fundamental and compelling as those of their 
parents. If anything, children’s familial rights are more compelling than 
adults’, because children’s interests in family relationships comprise more than 
the emotional and social interests which adults have in family life; children’s 
interests also include the elementary and wholly practical needs of the small 
and helpless to be protected from harm and to have stable and permanent 
homes in which each child’s mind and character can grow, unhampered by 
uncertainty and fear of what the next day or week or court appearance may 
bring.296 
In re Bridget acknowledges the fundamental right of a child to be protected 
from harm and to have a stable and permanent home as an interest that 
outweighs the parent’s fundamental decision-making rights. 
Similarly, another California court reversed the trial court’s removal of a 
child from grandparent custody because the court failed to consider factors 
associated with the child’s best interests, including the child’s special needs, 
wishes, and stability.297  Other jurisdictions also elevate a child’s relationship 
 
 294. Id. 
 295. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. App. 1996). 
 296. Id. at 521–22 (citing In re Jasmon O., 878 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1994)). 
 297. In re H.G. v. Mary H., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 370–72 (Cal. App. 2006).  In this case, the 
child was placed with the grandparents under the dependency statute.  Id. at 367, 370–71.  The 
California grandparent visitation statute, imposing a rebuttable presumption against grandparent 
visitation, was thus inapplicable.  Id. at 371; see also CAL. STAT. ANN. §3104 (2009) (“There is a 
rebuttable presumption that the visitation of a grandparent is not in the best interest of a minor 
child if the natural or adoptive parents agree that the grandparent should not be granted visitation 
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rights to a fundamental status and protect them by applying the BICS.  In a 
Kentucky case, the appellate court remanded the matter to determine whether a 
third party qualified as a de facto custodian entitled to custody based upon the 
BICS.298  In Minnesota, a trial court applied the BICS and avoided the 
presumption of parental fitness to solidify grandparent sole custody.299  The 
court ruled that once lost, the presumption of parental fitness is not 
automatically restored.300 
Some jurisdictions recognize a child’s fundamental right to a safe home.  
For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized that children possess 
fundamental rights in In re Brooklyn M.,301 where the court upheld the removal 
of the child from the mother despite a loving relationship: “As we have 
previously observed, ‘a parent’s genuine love for [the] child, or an existence of 
a bond between parent and child, is not sufficient to overcome the child’s 
fundamental right to a safe and nurturing environment.’”302  And in an Illinois 
parental termination case, the court recognized the fundamental right of a child 
to a stable home: 
  In the instant case, respondent had a history of not cooperating with 
referrals for psychological evaluation, psychological services, and medication 
assessment. Examination, evaluation, and assessment could go on indefinitely, 
particularly if as in the instant case, the parent refused to be examined or 
refused to cooperate. Such delay would defeat the child’s fundamental right to 
a stable nurturing home.303 
In both Rhode Island and Illinois, the courts recognized and protected the 
child’s fundamental right to a safe home.304  The most salient aspect of a safe 
and nurturing home, arguably, is the presence of a loving and nurturing parent-
like adult. 
So it seems that some state courts recognize the constitutional magnitude 
of the child’s relationship rights and that these rights are, perhaps, even 
superior to the corresponding parental relationship rights.  Some states, like 
Pennsylvania and California, have paved the way to identify and protect the 
 
rights.”); Harris v. Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 151–52 (Cal. 2004) (upholding constitutionality of the 
California grandparent visitation statute). 
 298. Baker v. Combs, 248 S.W.3d 581, 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). 
 299. In re Child of Evenson, 729 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 300. Id. 
 301. In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1122 (R.I. 2007). 
 302. Id. (citing In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002)). 
 303. In re Bernice B., 815 N.E.2d 778, 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).  See also K.N. v. R.P, No. 
2007-CA-000181-MR., 2008 WL 275106 at *15 (Ky. App. 2008) (acknowledging that children 
have a fundamental right to a safe home; but holding parents’ failures and drug problems were 
not enough to force the parents to relinquish their claim to the child). 
 304. See supra notes 301–03 and accompanying text. 
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fundamental relationship rights of children in third-party custody cases by 
requiring the application of the BICS. 
B. States Should Look Backwards to Shape the Future 
American courts formerly applied the BICS to disputes between fit parents 
and third parties.  For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the 
application of the BICS to award custody to a third party over the father’s 
objection in 1925: 
  As it affects the custody of infants, the writ of habeas corpus rests on the 
assumption of a right in the state, paramount to parental or other claim, to 
dispose of such children as their best interests require.  The legal rights of a 
parent are very gravely considered, but are not enforced to the disadvantage of 
the child.305 
A similar result was reached by the Virginia Supreme Court in affirming 
the application of the BICS to order the third party to return the child to the 
mother in 1852.306  In both cases, the third party had established a loving and 
nurturing relationship with the child and had custody of the children.  Thus, as 
early as 1854, American state courts in Virginia, Iowa, Texas, and Indiana 
inherently recognized that when the interests of the parent and child diverged 
in third-party custody claims brought by adults enjoying a parent-like 
relationship, the BICS controlled the outcome in each instance.307 
The BICS has historically provided to the courts a shorthand way to secure 
a child’s constitutional right to preserve existing loving and nurturing parent-
like relationships.  The characterization of the BICS as achieving a compelling 
state interest justifies limiting the relationship rights of legal and biological 
parents.  The BICS, therefore, provides one legal standard that adequately 
protects the fundamental rights of both parents and children, so long as the 
standard is sufficiently narrowly tailored, recognizing that the best interests 
and welfare of the child always constitutes a compelling state interest. 
 
 305. State ex rel. Jones v. West, 201 S.W. 743, 744–45 (Tenn. 1925); see also Luellen v. 
Younger, 143 N.E. 163, 164 (Ind. 1924) (requiring award of custody to foster parents over a fit 
father’s objection under BICS); Greene v. Walker, 199 N.W. 695, 697 (Mich. 1924) (citing In re 
Gould, 140 N.W. 1013, 1015 (Mich. 1913) (requiring award of custody to foster parents over a fit 
father’s objection under BICS)). 
 306. Armstrong v. Stone, 9 Gratt. 102, 103 (Va. 1852). 
 307. See Fonts v. Pierce, 19 N.W. 854, 854–55 (Iowa 1884) (applying BICS to affirm custody 
in third party over fit mother’s claim); Keesling v. Keesling, 85 N.E. 837, 839 (Ind. App. 1908) 
(applying BICS to affirm custody in grandfather over fit parental claims); LeGate v. LeGate, 29 
S.W. 212, 214 (Tex. 1894) (applying BICS to affirm custody in third party over fit mother’s 
claim). 
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V.  RECOGNIZING A CHILD’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A LOVING AND 
NURTURING PARENT-LIKE RELATIONSHIP AND CREATING A FRAMEWORK TO 
PROTECT IT. 
Law has a life of its own and is in constant flux in order to survive and 
remain relevant.  The law changes to reflect the values of the society and its 
aspirations.  After time, women gained freedom from the discriminatory laws 
that deprived them of personhood upon marriage and rendered them invisible 
to the law.  Now, children are poised for similar legal emancipation when 
courts decide third-party custody claims without regard to the biological or 
legal status of the adults, but rather, based upon evidence of loving and 
nurturing parent-like relationships, guided by the BICS. 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed third-party custody since 
Troxel, state courts have continued to deal regularly with the faulty family 
privacy parental presumption and the contorted reasoning it causes.  As the 
laboratories of democracy, state courts often pave the way for a national 
standard.308  The ability of states to implement policy through creating and 
interpreting the law permits other states and the federal government to monitor 
the success of the law in terms of achieving the desired policies and improving 
upon them.309  Additionally, many state constitutions have been interpreted to 
provide even greater protection for individuals than required under the United 
States Constitution.310 
A. A Child Enjoys a Fundamental Right to a Loving and Nurturing Parent-
like Relationship Protected by the BICS. 
The child’s fundamental right to continue existing loving and nurturing 
relationships is recognized and protected through the parens patriae power of 
the state to determine custody based on the BICS.  The BICS is a creature of 
common law, existing from time immemorial and has become the bedrock of 
our state custody statutory law as an outgrowth of early English common law.  
In fact, the BICS can be characterized as a right that is “so rooted in the 
 
 308. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). 
 309. Judith Olans Brown & Wendy E. Parmet, The Imperial Sovereign: Sovereign Immunity 
& The ADA, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2002) (“Thus, the experiments of a few states in 
educating children with disabilities refracted to the national level, leading to federal legislation 
mandating such rights even in those states that had failed to provide them. Without federal 
lawsuits, federal legislation and the federal money that came with it, however, it is doubtful that 
all states would have routinely educated the severely disabled children.”). 
 310. Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000 
Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to Individual Rights Under the United States and Minnesota’s 
Constitution, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 869–70 (2007). 
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traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental or 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”311 
At its core, the BICS is designed to identify and reinforce the child’s 
fundamental right to a loving and nurturing parent-like relationship.  This is 
evident in the BICS.  With its focus upon the child’s physical, psychological, 
and moral development, it is designed to identify and solidify the child’s 
relationship with parents and parent-like adults.  By expanding the parental 
privacy presumption in an attempt to limit state intervention into the realm of 
the family, the Supreme Court has diminished one aspect of children’s 
constitutional rights by rendering the child unseen and unheard in the 
constitutional debate of third-party custody claims.  Typically, the child’s right 
in custody cases is recognized and protected by the application of the BICS, 
which is rendered irrelevant under the Troxel third-party standing analysis so 
long as a legal parent is fit.312  By failing to recognize the role that the BICS 
plays in securing a child’s fundamental relationship rights, the state violates 
the substantive due process right of the child to continue existing loving and 
nurturing parent-like relationships. 
B. In Third-Party Custody Disputes, States Should Apply a Weighted 
Balancing Test—Deferring Always to the BICS to Protect the 
Fundamental Rights of Children. 
When a jurisdiction recognizes the child’s right to have the BICS applied 
in matters related to third-party custody and visitation, then a weighted 
balancing test must be employed.313  It follows that cases involving the 
competing rights of fit parents, parent-like adults, and children require an 
approach that permits the court to consider the fundamental rights of the 
parents and the child involved in each dispute.  In such cases, the courts are 
called upon to balance the burden to constitutional rights314 experienced by 
each of the harmed individuals. 
 
 311. Michael H. v. Gerald H., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 312. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67–70 (2000) (rejecting the notion that any third 
party seeking visitation has standing and shall be granted visitation if in the child’s best interest, 
holding instead that courts should defer to the parents’ decision). 
 313. See e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007). 
 314. Scholars have commented on the absence of such balancing.  See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, 
Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 
1377, 1388 (1994): 
[W]ithin any constitutional analysis, there is the possibility of conflicting individual 
constitutional rights. So it is possible that the parent’s constitutional rights would conflict 
with the child’s constitutional rights, necessitating a balancing of rights. However, this 
approach has been relatively rare, perhaps because the state is invested with parens 
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The best approach might be to treat the child’s fundamental right to the 
application of the BICS as trumping, in every instance, a parent’s fundamental 
right to custody.315  This approach focuses on the child and is consistent with 
state law custody precedent.  It elevates the best interests of the child above the 
interests of all others.  This approach advances the child’s right to continue 
loving and nurturing parent-like relationships with a parent, or parent-like adult 
to the level of a paramount right protected by the BICS. 
Alternatively, third-party custody cases could be viewed as presenting 
competing fundamental right claims between a parent and a child.  Courts 
might then choose to apply a hybrid test.  For example, Justice Scalia has 
recognized that in “hybrid” cases, the statutes at issue although facially neutral, 
could upon application, substantially burden multiple constitutionally protected 
rights.316  For example, statutes compelling school attendance,317 license plate 
 
patriae status to assert the child’s rights or possibly because the lesser status of minors’ 
constitutional rights insure that any parental fundamental right would dominate. 
Fallon notes that: 
  In view of the differences among these interpretations, it is little exaggeration to say 
that there are three strict scrutiny tests, not one, though all bear the same label.  Not 
surprisingly, uncertainty and confusion have arisen about which version the Court will 
apply in cases in which the differences among the tests would result in different 
outcomes.  Indeed, the coexistence of three versions of strict scrutiny has not infrequently 
occasioned confusion among the justices themselves. 
Fallon, supra note 313, at 1303.   
 315. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, supra note 1, at 1479. 
 316. Justice Scalia referred to cases involving more than one constitutional right as “hybrid” 
cases.  Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 
(1990).  Citing a variety of case law, Justice Scalia acknowledge the right of parents in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and to direct the education of their children in Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which invalidated compulsory school-attendance laws “as applied 
to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school.”  Scalia went 
on to write: 
Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free 
speech grounds, have also involved freedom of religion, cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705 (1977) (invalidating compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended 
individual religious beliefs); West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (invalidating compulsory flag salute statute challenged by religious objectors).  
And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds 
would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns. Cf. Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (‘An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, 
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously 
protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative freedom to engage in group 
effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed’). 
Dept. of Human Res., 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
 317. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (holding that First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the state 
from compelling the parents to cause their children to attend school through age sixteen). 
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display,318 and flag salute319 violated free speech, free association, and privacy 
rights. Although in many of the hybrid cases identified by Justice Scalia, the 
statutes at issue burdened multiple fundamental rights possessed by one 
individual, the Court has occasionally employed a hybrid balancing approach 
to determine the constitutionality of statutes burdening the rights of multiple 
stakeholders, as in Prince,320 Meyer,321 and Yoder.322 
The recognition that constitutional harm cannot be analyzed in a vacuum—
but requires, instead, a hybrid analysis—applies with equal force to third-party 
custody claims in relationship to the stakeholders: the parent, child, and state.  
The traditional, unitary, and isolated analysis of third-party custody disputes, 
focusing solely on the constitutional rights of the legally recognized parents, 
ignores the fundamental relationship rights of the child that would otherwise be 
protected and championed through the BICS. 
Some of the Supreme Court Justices have recognized the utility of a 
balancing approach in parental termination cases.  For example, in Santosky, 
Justices Rehnquist, White, and O’Conner dissented.323  Each would have 
upheld the preponderance of the evidence standard to terminate parental rights 
under New York law.324  The dissenters argued that the interests of the child 
and the state must be balanced against those of the parent: 
  When, in the context of a permanent neglect termination proceeding, the 
interests of the child and the State in a stable, nurturing home life are balanced 
against the interests of the parents in the rearing of their child, it cannot be said 
that either set of interests is so clearly paramount as to require that the risk of 
error be allocated to one side or the other. Accordingly, a State constitutionally 
may conclude that the risk of error should be borne in roughly equal fashion by 
use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof.  This is precisely 
the balance which has been struck by the New York Legislature: “It is the 
intent of the legislature in enacting this section to provide procedures not only 
assuring that the rights of the natural parent are protected, but also, where 
positive, nurturing parent-child relationships no longer exist, furthering the 
 
 318. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding State may not compel appellees 
to display the state motto on their vehicle license plates). 
 319. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compelling the flag salute and pledge 
in schools violates the First Amendment). 
 320. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 158–64 (1994) (finding rights of religion and 
parental rights are at issue where mother supplied nine-year-old daughter with religious 
magazines instructing her to distribute them in violation of state law).  Here, the Court held the 
First Amendment religious freedom did not exempt the mother and her daughter from state law 
prohibiting magazine distribution by minor children.  Id. at 169–71. 
 321. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (rejecting a state statute that prohibited 
teaching modern foreign languages to school children). 
 322. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. 
 323. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 324. Id. at 791. 
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best interests, needs, and rights of the child by terminating the parental rights 
and freeing the child for adoption.325 
Perhaps, the proper question courts should ask whether the legislature has 
struck a constitutional balance between the fundamental rights of the parent 
and of the child, in light of the state interests involved. In third-party custody 
claims, legal constructions related to standing, evidentiary burdens, and 
family-privacy presumptions326 substantially interfere with the fundamental 
relationship rights of the child and should be discarded and replaced by the 
BICS.327 
Custody disputes have a substantial impact on the fundamental rights of 
both the parent and the child.  State legislators should consider amending 
custody statutes to permit fit third parties who can establish the existence of 
loving and nurturing parent-like relationships to assert a claim for custody or 
visitation to advance the child’s fundamental relationship rights. In some cases, 
the justification for a legal parental preference has arguably been lost by 
permitting third-party relationships to flourish.  This approach is further 
buttressed by the state’s compelling interest in securing a child’s fundamental 
right to continue existing loving and nurturing parent-like relationships.  The 
child’s relationship rights are secured and advanced by applying the BICS. 
Even if the BICS is not deemed to be a paramount and compelling state 
interest, trumping the rights of legal and biological parents, the child’s 
relationship rights are at least equivalent to a parent’s rights and should be 
afforded equal weight and consideration in third-party custody disputes. 
Because the child’s fundamental right to continue existing loving and nurturing 
parent-like relationships is raised in third-party custody disputes, the court 
should proceed with a BICS and undertake a weighted balancing test to 
adequately protect the fundamental rights of all stakeholders.328 
 
 325. Id. (citations omitted). 
 326. Arguably, third parties reduce the justification for biological or legal parent custody 
presumptions if they voluntarily establish a parent-like relationship with the child with the 
consent of the legal or biological parent. 
 327. An evidentiary presumption is one way a legislature redistributes the risk of error.  For 
example, in criminal matters, the defendant is presumed innocent and the state bears a heavy 
burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, to secure conviction.  Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 
230 (1987).  In contrast, the legislature may equally assign the burden of proof by rejecting 
presumptions and heightened burdens of proof.  Moreover, presumptions of proof may help 
regulate the process of proof.  RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND 
CASES 744 (4th ed.). 
 328. Assuming the child’s right to a relationship with a parent or parent-like individual is 
recognized as fundamental, the further constitutionalization of family law results, in fact, in a 
return to careful fact-finding based upon a complete record designed to secure the child’s welfare, 
free from presumptions related to genetic, marital, social, or gender presumptions.  See Meyer, 
The Constitutionalization of Family Law, supra note 16, at 572 (noting that constitutionalization 
“is beginning to resemble the discretionary, fact-intensive family law of old”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The ancient concept of parens patriae explains the state’s initial 
involvement in public child custody determinations.  The state relies upon the 
BICS to carry out its protective role in private custody disputes between fit 
parents.  An examination of the BICS reveals its purpose: To protect and 
nurture the child’s well-being, including the parent-like relationships enjoyed 
by the child.  The most recent ALI principles recognize that, in some instances, 
this parent-like relationship has developed between a child and a third party, 
and the child’s right to continue the relationship is preeminent.  The cannon of 
unenumerated constitutional rights has expanded over the century, with a focus 
on individual and family privacy.  The presumption that all fit parents act in 
the best interests of their children is sometimes factually inaccurate; 
nevertheless, it effectively silences the voice of the child in third-party custody 
actions and is, therefore, unjust.  As American society evolves and changes, so 
must the legal standards defining the rights and obligations of minors. 
Therefore, courts should recognize that the BICS gives succor to the 
child’s fundamental right to continue existing loving and nurturing parent-like 
relationship.  The BICS should be applied in third-party custody cases to insure 
that the child’s fundamental right to continue existing loving and nurturing 
parent-like relationships is treated as paramount, or at least balanced against a 
parent’s fundamental right to assert family privacy. 
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